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ABSTRACT 
Directed energy weapons (DEW) have been pursued by the military and defence industry 
since the 1980’s. Some potential technology demonstrators have been showcased over the 
decades but not until recently there have been a number of promising programmes. This 
dissertation was performed to find out what is the applicability of DEWs in the Ground Based 
Air Defence (GBAD) domain in 2025-2030. 
A thorough literature review was conducted to find answer to a sub-question: ‘What are the 
DE technologies and systems under development for AA (Anti-Aircraft) and CRAM 
(Counter Rockets Artillery Mortar)?’ It was established that there are 15 programmes in total 
of which 14 are laser and 1 is HPRF (High Power Radio Frequency) system.  
Next a Delphi panel was used to find answers for the second sub-question: ‘What is the 
maturity level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030’. In total three Delphi iteration rounds were 
performed. This was followed by Technology Readiness Level (TRL) assessment done by 
utilizing USAF TRL calculator. 
Finally the results of literature review, Delphi and TRL assessment were combined and it 
was established that there are three potential GBAD systems to reach full technological 
maturity in 2021-2029 which could mean the systems would be commonly in use in 2025-
2035. Other main findings include: 
- Despite the lengthy research and testing many obstacles remain to mature the 
technologies to the level where they could be deployed 
- Output powers of current DEW are far from being adequate in engaging manned 
aircraft size targets  
- DEWs can engage UAV’s within 2-3km in 2021-2029 
- DEWs can engage UAV’s within 10 km in 2024-2030 
- DEWs can engage manned aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles from ranges 
exceeding 10 km in 2026-2037 
The main research question: ‘What is the applicability of directed energy weapons when 
replacing or developing Finland’s GBAD capabilities after 2025?’ was answered by 
comparing the results with classified GBAD development plans. These results are presented 
in a separate classified annexe not part of this public document. 
KEY WORDS Directed energy, Technological readiness, Ground Based Air Defence, 
Maturity assessment, Laser, HPRF, HPM 
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THE TECHNOLOGICAL MATURITY OF GROUND-BASED DIRECTED ENERGY 
AIR DEFENCE SYSTEMS IN 2025-2030 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
“You miss hundred percent of the shots you don’t take.” 
 
Wayne Gretzky (1960- ) 
 
In contrast to many business domains where achieving second and third place still means 
making a profit, on the battlefield, there are no in-betweens, you are either the first or you are 
the last. Throughout the history, technological advances have been shaping the battlefield, and 
in many occasions, the one with the technical advantage has triumphed. This has resulted in a 
willingness to invest more and more in sophisticated military equipment, and thus a technology 
race has been part of military ever since the era of crossbows and catapults.  
In general, defence acquisitions are based on capability needs stemming from the capability 
owner’s analysis regarding the battlefield of the future. Although the future battlefield analysis 
is a complicated and time-consuming process considering numerous facts and figures, the cause 
for a capability need can be categorised into two main classes. The other is the need for an 
entirely novel capability and the second is the need to renew or modernise the existing 
capability. In many cases, the capability requirement is related to the technological changes in 
the battlefield. 
Regardless of the cause, a thorough preliminary assessment of the availability, usability, and 
affordability is conducted at the very beginning of the acquisition process. Many aspects of the 
technological and tactical development are constantly followed, but in most cases, a separate 
and distinct study is in place. The preliminary assessment provides, should it be conducted and 
appropriately resourced, the basics to assess the feasibility of the programme to proceed to 
further stages. In some cases, the technology aspired is not mature enough, and sometimes there 
may be affordability or availability issues. Nonetheless, these all can be regarded as 
showstoppers or at least they are factors that must be known once the decision is made for the 
continuation of the acquisition programme. 
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Should an acquisition programme fail to deliver there normally are only two poor options left. 
We either accept we did not get the pursued capability or we invest more in the programme thus 
spending money originally allotted to something else.  In both cases, the results will be severe 
and may even lead to lost battles and even wars. Hence, reliable and justifiable methods 
undertaken meticulously are or at least should be, an inherent part of defence acquisition and 
procurement. As the defence budgets are finite, no nation just cannot afford careless 
acquisitions as they will incur capability related knock-on effects for many decades to come. 
The precise and accurate processes decrease the chance of procuring capability with an 
unfavourable value for money ratio and, in the worst case, acquiring materiel not fit for purpose. 
1.1. Project Aims and Research Questions 
This dissertation intends to provide support for the decision makers of the future Ground Based 
Air Defence (GBAD) acquisitions. It is a research assessing specifically the maturity of 
Directed Energy Weapon (DEW) technologies and their feasibility as part of Finland’s GBAD 
arsenal in the decades to come. The intention is not to find justifications why DEW’s should or 
should not be acquired or to compare modern contemporary weapons with DEWs. These are, 
however, paramount questions and it is assumed they will be researched and studied as the 
programme proceeds to following phases.  The research questions for this study are introduced 
and covered in detail later in this sub-chapter.  
For decades The DEWs have been seen as the future technology revolutionising military. 
Should they live up to their promises the military could see game-changing effects in numerous 
different areas, not least in GBAD. Thus far, however, DEWs have not been able to meet the 
expectations and promises, but there are clear signals that things may be changing. Recently we 
have witnessed several live demonstrators in action, mainly lasers, with promising results. 
Furthermore, there have been prominent announcements by major US and British defence 
actors stressing the importance of funding and further developing DEWs. The big question is 
how to forecast what will happen in the DEW scene and when?  
As it was said, this project seeks to find scientifically justified facts to enhance decision makers’ 
chance to make timely and accurate decisions regarding GBAD acquisitions concerning the 
decades to come. The maturity of any technology is vital information when decisions are made 
regarding capability gaps. The decision makers should be, earlier the better, informed of any 
possible technological foxholes regarding the sought capability. This will enable timely 
decisions to allocate resources.  
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This research is not part of a particular acquisition programme thus it provides a more of an 
overview of the maturity of DEW technology instead of focusing on a specific domain of 
GBAD. The focus is on assessing the maturity of mobile land-based Anti-aircraft (AA) and 
Counter Mortar Artillery Rockets (CRAM) systems in 2030 and beyond. Seaborne and airborne 
applications are, however, not excluded. This is because some of the main achievements in the 
field of DEW are related to maritime and airborne applications. 
Since this study is generic in nature, it does not adopt a single definition or requirement for a 
feasible GBAD solution as there are numerous different user needs. A system capable of 
repelling small unmanned air vehicles (UAV), which is one GBAD task, will not necessarily 
be feasible to prosecute incoming ballistic missiles. This a classic requirement writing problem; 
one must understand the user needs first. Hence this study looks at the GBAD domain, together 
with its target portfolio, as a whole.  
The research intends to answer the following main research question: 
-    What is the applicability of directed energy weapons when replacing or developing Finland’s 
GBAD capabilities after 2025? 
The main question is supported by the following two sub-questions (SQ): 
1.    What are the DE technologies and systems under development for AA and CRAM? (SQ1) 
2.    What is the maturity level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030? (SQ2) 
However, albeit this research has a particular main research question, it does not mean that 
answers to the sub-questions would not serve a purpose by themselves. On the contrary, their 
answers can be used in their right for other uses too.  For example, should the need be, the main 
research question could be tailored to provide answers to suit another nation while utilising the 
answers of SQ 1 and 2.    
1.2. Limitations and Assumptions 
There are challenges in writing an unclassified research of a current or future military topic. 
Many areas of this research are closely related to classified information. This is especially the 
case when dealing with novel technology. It would be extremely time consuming and somewhat 
impossible to gather enough classified material to conduct a thorough scientific thesis of a 
delicate subject like this. That would require initiating an official acquisition programme with 
all the resources behind it. 
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Moreover, there are also classification issues in applying the results of this study to Finnish 
national defence development programmes. Hence all conclusions relating to national defence 
are covered in a separate classified annexe which will not be presented in the unclassified 
section of this study.  Also, as this thesis has a steadfast deadline and is conducted as part of an 
academic degree there are limitations regarding the available time and manning.   
1.3. Related Researches 
This research is a part of Army Command’s programme for replacing and enhancing Ground 
Based Air Defence capabilities and bases its threat scenario to a future air threat study. Also, it 
utilises and supports the following FDF’s research programme areas: surveillance of air 
vehicles, air defence in nation’s defence, countering air threat of the future and missile threat 
management. The specific topics and connections to the related researches are covered in the 
classified annexe which is not publicly available. 
2. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
To answer the research questions, there was a need to decide which methods could be 
implemented together with understanding the possible interrelations of the questions. First, the 
research questions were analysed to enable focusing on the right field of research methods.  An 
important notion concerns the time dimensions of the research questions. SQ2 clearly concerns 
matters of the future whereas SQ1 is to do with the ‘as is’. As a result, a need for multiple 
approaches was identified. To provide answers for SQ2, there was a need for a technology 
oriented futures research methodology. SQ1, on the other hand, could be replied to by 
performing a literature review of the DEW technology and the current situation of the systems. 
The main research question, on the other hand, called for comprising the answers of SQ1 and 2 
together with the plans how Finnish Air Defence will meet the requirements of the future 
battlefield. 
Based on the notion that SQ1 required a futures research method, a number of them were 
assessed and to enable the selection of the most useful one. This process is further described in 
the following chapter.  
2.1. Futures Research Methods  
There are various futures research methods utilised on a broad scope of research topics across 
the academic and business domains. For this research, there was a need for a method/s that 
would provide valid answers in assessing the technological maturity of DEWs in the years to 
come. 
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As the assessment of technical maturity has been an important part of both business and military 
for many decades, some methods have been developed. As a significant feature, many of these 
methods have been utilised in numerous researches and studies, and thus their applicability and 
validity can be assessed based on their actual real world results. A characteristic of futures 
research is that one can evaluate how good the results were after the forecasted date has become 
a reality. The downside is, however, that many of these studies are classified, and hence their 
validity or accuracy cannot be assessed. Regardless of the classification issues, a great number 
of unclassified academic papers can be found which not only implement the methods but also 
evaluate their suitability [49][63]. The assessment of the validity of a particular method in the 
context of this study was performed by searching both studies that implemented futures research 
methods as well as literature on futures research. 
A comprehensive and somewhat exhaustive list of futures research methods is portrayed in 
Futures Research Methodology 3.0 edited by J.C. Glenn and T.J. Gordon [30]. Futures research 
methods are commonly divided into two categories; normative and exploratory [68] [55]. These 
types differ mainly in their approach to the future. In normative approach one first establishes 
future goals, desires, needs or missions. The path to achieve, or avoid; these targets are then 
studied. Exploratory methods, on the other hand, are more classical methods of actually 
forecasting the future. They, as the name suggests, explore possible futures and assess their 
probabilities. Exploratory methods mainly analyse historical data and forecast by following 
trends and patterns [68].  
There are, however, occasions when both exploratory and normative methods are employed in 
conjunction, and there also are methods which incorporate attributes from both categories. 
Furthermore, views are dating back to 1960s, which support the combined use to achieve 
validity [55]. This aggregation of normative and explorative approaches has already partially 
occurred, and there are supporters for a more holistic approach to futures research instead of 
relying on a single method [4]. This trend can also be seen in many studies where both 
normative and explorative methods are applied. 
A conclusion can be drawn that despite the number of methods, a single method seldom 
provides a justified and valid answer. In fact, many of them seem more or less artificial when 
it comes to actual differences [30]. This may result in a complicated situation when the 
researcher is assessing which method would best serve his/her quest in answering the research 
questions.  
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As per this research, some of the methods could be quickly ruled out as they are not designed 
to provide answers to technological problems. As examples of the futures research methods that 
were considered invalid for this research from the outset are ‘Multiple Perspective Concepts’, 
‘Morphological Analysis’ and ‘Heuristics Modelling’.  
It needs to be appreciated that the very nature of futures research is heavily dependent on the 
situation when the research is conducted. Numerous variables may, and likely will change over 
the course of years and thus the results are no longer correct. As Roy Amara [4] puts it; the 
future is not predetermined, and it can be changed by our choices and decisions. This fact about 
the essence of future should be kept in mind when reading the results of this study. The results 
reflect only to the knowledge at hand when the study is conducted; any change can either hinder 
or accelerate the development and proliferation of DEW. This study provides information for 
decisions made in 2017-18. For later use, the background situation has to be checked to identify 
possible changes and analysis made whether the results are still valid. Pivotal background 
information includes, but is not limited to, threat, funding, legislature, and unprecedented 
technological breakthroughs. These are all attributes which may mould the future of DEW. For 
example, a new threat which is seen only to be repelled by using DEW would increase the 
funding and thus enhance the development resources which could result in a drastic change in 
the maturity forecast. On the other hand, should we see the DEWs, laser, in particular, clash 
with the rules of war, for instance, we could witness an entirely opposite situation. 
2.2. The Applied Research Methodology 
In order to answer the main research question we first have to answer the sub-questions. 
Furthermore, it is evident we must have answers to SQ1 prior to tackling SQ2. One simply 
requires adequate understanding of the problem space, the DEW technology in this case, before 
the implementation of the methods of SQ2 is possible.  
To allow us the use of appropriate and suitable research methods to tackle all the questions an 
analysis was performed. Based on the analysis a set of methods were selected. The methods 
alongside with the answering logic are depicted in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Roadmap for Answering the Research Questions. 
 
It was decided that literature review amended with possible expert interviews would provide 
answers for SQ1. There are problems relating to only using open and unclassified sources, and 
this needs to be taken into account when reading the results. In other words, there may be 
technological advances and capabilities which are not presented here. Nonetheless, the majority 
of the basics will remain unchanged and mitigate invalid/missing information the literature 
review pursues to cover the topic as exhaustive as possible. As this is a basic research regarding 
the maturity of DEW technology, there is no need at this point to describe detailed information 
of a particular weapon system. Furthermore, no attempt is made in comparing the current 
systems’ capabilities against each other. Should the need be, this will be performed during the 
acquisition programme using the information provided by the tenders. 
Based on the search of possible research methods the primary method for answering SQ2 was 
decided to be the Delphi- method. As shown in Figure 1, one of the main purpose of the answers 
of SQ1 is to enable the research to continue to SQ2. Without the insight and understanding 
achieved in answering SQ1 there would be little chance of composing well-founded questions 
for the Delphi panellists to answer.    
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As was discussed earlier, an implementation of a supporting method is highly recommended as 
the additional method would enhance the validity of the results.  The use of complementary 
methods is recommended by many practitioners of futures research as a single method rarely 
provides sound and justified answers. Hence it was decided to seek answers to SQ2 also by 
using a method called TRL assessment.  
While the results provided by TRL assessment would serve as a complimentary data but they 
could also be used should we fail to get results from the Delphi. After all, as this is research 
with a firm deadline it was also seen vital to mitigate the possible risk of either not being able 
to form a credible Delphi panel or in the event of unacceptable dropout rate of panellists. This 
mitigation was done by including the TRL Assessment method. 
The selected methods are introduced in detail in the following chapters. 
2.3. Delphi Method 
A method applied in a high number of futures technological maturity studies is the Delphi 
method. It is a method developed by the RAND- Corporation in the 1950s to provide a 
systematic approach to utilise expert opinions [16][34]. The early pioneers, if not developers, 
were Norman Dalkey and Olaf Helmer who introduced iteration into the process after which it 
received the name Delphi [16]. According to Helmer, the very foundation of the Delphi was the 
realisation that projections of the future were mostly based on the personal expectations of 
individuals rather than on predictions derived from a well-established theory [34].  
From this standpoint, the Delphi was developed to aggregate the judgements of subject matter 
experts while minimising interference and maximising validity. As the notion of personal 
expectations suggest, there is a scientific problem when dealing with expert opinion. Dalkey 
sums up the difference between knowledge, opinion and speculation by saying there is a 
distinction in the likelihood of correctness. In knowledge, the likelihood is high, in speculation 
low and opinion something in between [15]. The problem being there is no valid method to 
measure the degree of likelihood, hence, in the eyes of science, opinion has little weight. 
Nonetheless, it is the opinions that should be aggregated since the question is concerning the 
future which hardly anyone can possess knowledge of. 
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Furthermore, as stated by both Dalkey and Helmer, there is solid evidence that opinion may be 
interfered when shared in face-to-face conversations. This occurs because of the presence of 
dominant individuals, authority issues, bandwagoning, unwillingness to abandon publicly 
expressed opinions and group pressure [34][15]. These all alter the result and have led to 
inclusion of anonymity as one of the three cornerstones of Delphi. It is important that the group 
members are kept anonymous to one another to enable the experts to maintain their opinions 
and change them only when they see it necessary. The anonymity, however, does not mean the 
researcher would not be aware of the answers’ identity. The repliers’ identities are in some 
cases crucial information when the answers are analysed.  
The second main character is the iteration with controlled feedback [15]. The iteration process 
performs the interaction among the panellists. Iteration is usually done by introducing the 
summary of the results of the previous stage for the panellists before they are to answer the next 
round. With the information at their use, they are then asked to reassess their previous answers. 
They are not necessarily expected to arrive at the same conclusion even after multiple iteration 
rounds, but their responses typically tend to converge. It is, in fact, important to understand the 
result is not supposed to be unanimous. After the iteration rounds, the researcher then 
implements statistical analysis to establish the result of the group response.  The result of the 
group response reflects the opinion of all the experts. This is based on the statistical method the 
final answer is derived with. It is widely stated in the literature that median provides the most 
accurate results when a classic forecast Delphi is conducted [15][34][16].  In a ranking –type 
Delphi, however, Kendall’s W is the most commonly utilised statistical method in assessing 
group consensus [58].  
The Delphi technique in its simplest form eliminates committee activity among the experts 
altogether and replaces it with a carefully designed program of subsequent interrogations 
interspersed with information and opinion feedback [34]. 
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2.4. Validating Delphi Results by Statistical Tests 
Interpreting the Delphi results depends on the type of Delphi implemented. Ranking type Delphi 
requires statistical methods to ascertain the validity and level of consensus whereas in classic 
Delphi a more direct approach can be utilised. The vitality of implementing statistical tests to 
ensure the results are statistically valid is commonly stressed by the researchers 
[10][35][49][58]. Furthermore, without such testing, it would be difficult to establish stopping 
criteria for iteration.  
Also, the statistical approach provides rigour and reliable statistics especially when the sample 
size is small as it enables us to determine the degree of consensus among the respondents [10]. 
It is also important to utilise an accepted statistical method instead of relying on percentages or 
standard deviation as they do not ensure a consensus has been reached [10]. The latter applies 
specifically to ranking type Delphi. 
Based on those above, a method to assess the group’s overall agreement was required for this 
study too.   This method should be applicable in a situation where multiple factors are rated by 
multiple respondents and specifically to ascertain that the panel had in fact reached consensus. 
Based on recommendations made by Delphi practitioners and statistics professionals the 
Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) was selected as the statistical method to assess the 
group consensus of the ranking questions [37][49][62][35][10][83]. Furthermore, the statistical 
significance of the results was decided to be assessed by computing the p-value[62]. 
The Kendall coefficient of concordance (W) measures the degree of association among several 
sets of rankings. It can be used to reject the null hypothesis which in this case assumes that there 
is no significant agreement among the panellists. To compute W, we begin by arranging the 
data into a k × N table where each row indicates the ranking of factors by a single panellist. In 
the table, we have k number of panellists and N number of ranked attributes. Then the average 
rank ?̅?𝑖 is established by dividing the sum of the ranks in a column by k. After this we calculate 
the grand mean of ?̅?𝑖’s by dividing their sum by k [37][62]. 
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To compute Kendall coefficient of concordance we use equation: 𝑊 =
∑ (𝑁𝑖=1 ?̅?𝑖− ?̅?)
2
𝑁(𝑁2−1)/12
 
In the equation: 
N = number of ranked objects 
?̅?𝑖 = average of the ranks assigned to the ith object 
?̅? = grand mean of the ranks assigned across all objects 
𝑁(𝑁2 − 1)/12 = maximum possible sum of the squared deviations, i.e. the numerator which 
would occur if there were perfect agreement among the k rankings 
Kendall’s W gives a value ranging from zero to one. Zero means the panellists are in total 
disagreement whereas one refers to perfect concordance [62]. While there are no universal and 
absolute threshold values for assessing the level of agreement some commonly used limits can 
be found. Based on Schmidt [58] and Okoli et.al.  [49], this thesis uses 0.7 as a level for strong 
agreement and 0.5 for moderate agreement. These limits are not, however, considered absolute 
and thus the analysis may conclude that a strong agreement has been reached with W values 
less than 0.7. 
It needs to be emphasised, however, that a significant value of W does not indicate correct 
answers. It merely states the respondents are in consensus. It is the Delphi iteration which, if 
the panellists are chosen correctly, legitimises the accuracy of the answers. 
Whereas W informs us about the agreement of the panellist, it does not provide information 
about statistical validity. This means we do not know if the results are based on chance. Hence 
there is a need to test the significance of the particular W. This is done by computing the p- 
value using MS Excel’s CHIDIST- function. However, before CHIDIST- function can be used 
we need to compute Chi-Square (X²) distribution value.  
The X² distribution value is calculated by using the equation:  X2 = 𝑘(𝑁 − 1)𝑊 
In the equation: 
k = number of panellists 
N = number of ranked objects 
W = Kendall coefficient of concordance 
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The MS Excel’s CHIDIST- function calculates the right-tailed probability of the Chi-Square 
distribution and provides an accurate p- value. To provide an idea how the statistical validity 
could be obtained without MS Excel a short introduction is presented next together with a 
version of the Chi-Square distribution table (Table 1) [62]. 
After computing the X², the value is compared with the critical values of the chi-square 
distribution depicted in table 1 below. The correct value for ‘Degrees of Freedom’ (Df) is 
N-1, i.e. if N is 10 then N-1 = 9 so Df is 9. The W value is deemed statistically significant if 
the X² value exceeds the value of the decided column. The column is chosen based on the 
accepted risk level which most commonly is either 0.05 or 0.01 [62]. In this thesis, we 
consider 0.05 as the threshold value and as said we let MS Excel compute the p-value 
directly, so there is no need to refer to the table. 
Table 1: Chi-Square Distribution table. Adapted from [66]. 
2.5. Technology Readiness Level Assessment 
The concept of Technology Readiness Levels (TRL) and their assessment was first introduced 
by NASA in 1974 [9]. The first scale had seven levels, but it has evolved over the years to its 
current form of encompassing nine tiers. TRL assessment was rapidly adopted by many 
militaries and other governmental organisations. Amongst the actors utilising the TRL concept, 
there are NASA, European Space Agency, UK Ministry of Defence, US Department of Defense 
and US Department of Energy [22][71][74][76]. The list is by no means exhaustive but provides 
an idea how pervasive the TRL concept is.   
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The idea behind TRL’s is a commonly understood method for explaining to collaborators and 
stakeholders the maturity of a particular technology [9]. In other words, TRL’s provides a 
common language and rigour for assessing and discussing an extremely complicated issue 
without interpretation problems or vested interests. The table below depicts the nine levels and 
their descriptions as defined by US DoD. 
Technology Readiness Level   Description  
 1.  Basic principles observed and reported  Lowest level of technology readiness. Scientific research begins to be translated into 
applied research and development. Examples might include paper studies of a 
technology's basic properties.  
 2.  Technology concept and/or application 
formulated.  
Invention begins. Once basic principles are observed, practical applications can be 
invented. Applications are speculative and there may be no proof or detailed analysis to 
support the assumptions. Examples are limited to analytic studies.  
 3.  Analytical and experimental critical function 
and/or characteristic proof of concept.  
Active research and development is initiated. This includes analytical studies and 
laboratory studies to physically validate analytical predictions of separate elements of the 
technology. Examples include components that are not yet integrated or representative.  
 4.  Component and/or breadboard validation 
in laboratory environment  
Basic technological components are integrated to establish that they will work together. 
This is relatively "low fidelity" compared to the eventual system. Examples include 
integration of "ad hoc" hardware in the laboratory.  
 5.  Component and/or breadboard validation 
in relevant environment.  
Fidelity of breadboard technology increases significantly. The basic technological 
components are integrated with reasonably realistic supporting elements so it can be 
tested in a simulated environment. Examples include "high fidelity" laboratory integration of 
components.  
 6.  System/subsystem model or prototype 
demonstration in a relevant environment.  
Representative model or prototype system, which is well beyond that of TRL 5, is tested in 
a relevant environment. Represents a major step up in a technology's demonstrated 
readiness. Examples include testing a prototype in a high-fidelity laboratory environment or 
in simulated operational environment.  
 7.  System prototype demonstration in an 
operational environment.  
Prototype near, or at, planned operational system. Represents a major step up from TRL 
6, requiring demonstration of an actual system prototype in an operational environment 
such as an aircraft, vehicle, or space. Examples include testing the prototype in a test bed 
aircraft.  
 8.  Actual system completed and qualified 
through test and demonstration.  
Technology has been proven to work in its final form and under expected conditions. In 
almost all cases, this TRL represents the end of true system development. Examples 
include developmental test and evaluation of the system in its intended weapon system to 
determine if it meets design specifications.  
 9.  Actual system proven through successful 
mission operations.  
Actual application of the technology in its final form and under mission conditions, such as 
those encountered in operational test and evaluation. Examples include using the system 
under operational mission conditions.  
Table 2: Technology Readiness Levels of US DoD. Adapted from [73]. 
 
It is noteworthy that technological readiness of a system is an aggregate of the TRL’s of its sub-
systems [71]. Normally, at any given time during the systems development, the individual sub-
systems’ technological readiness levels vary from one another. This is because each sub-system 
is developed individually and its maturing does not depend on other sub-systems. As a 
consequence, there may be a situation where individual sub-systems are on TRL8 while some 
are on TRL4. It follows that the TRL of parent system cannot be higher than any of its 
subordinate systems [71]. This idea is illustrated in Figure 2 which depicts a generic TRL 
assessment of a missile system. In addition, one must also bear in mind that even if the example 
missile system reaches TRL9, it needs to be integrated into a platform and also requires systems 
for loading, maintenance and logistics. These systems may not yet have reached TRL9, so the 
capability will not be in use although the missile system has reached full maturity. 
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Figure 2: Sub-systems with Different TRL’s [71]. 
Many of the organisations utilising TRL’s have tailored NASA’s scale and its definitions, but 
the main idea is the same. As this research concerns military applications, it is seen justifiable 
to implement a bespoke military scale. In addition to selecting the scale to be used, there was 
also a need for a calculator to assist with the assessment.  It was found that there are both USAF 
[45][78] and UK MOD TRL [70] calculators available online. The UK MOD version is, in fact, 
a system readiness tool and thus takes a more holistic view. Nonetheless, both calculators are 
applicable for this research. 
In this research, it was decided to use the USAF version. This decision stems from the limited 
access to data, as this is an unclassified research, combined with the massive amount of metrics 
the UK MOD calculator requires. The assessment was that there just was not enough accessible 
data that could have enabled the use of the UK MOD calculator. This does not, however, mean 
that we have access to all the metrics for the USAF calculator either, but the number of 
assumptions is significantly smaller. The use and the deficiencies of the selected TRL calculator 
are discussed in chapter 4.5. 
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2.6. Forecasting Years to Maturity based on TRL 
This research finds TRL assessment useful as it provides a justified and proven method for 
assessing current maturity of DEW. Furthermore, after assessing TRL’s of the DEW systems, 
we have a baseline for determining the timeframe when they could reach full maturity (TRL9). 
This assessment can then be compared with the results of Delphi panel for further analysis and 
discussion. 
For us to estimate the time required for a system to obtain TRL 9, we can use two methods. We 
can utilise historical data of past TRL development, or we can draw conclusions from other 
studies which have assessed TRL progression.  
Examples and graphs of historical data can be found in the literature, and they exhibit examples 
of both slow and fast maturing. As an example of rapid maturing is the noise-reducing chevrons 
for which it took only a total of seven years from TRL 1 to TRL9 [9]. The chevron case is 
described as exceptional, and it also needs to be appreciated that it does not consist finesse 
electronics or mechanics as it is a new design of a jet engine's nozzle. 
A study which has composed a table indicating TRL maturation timeline states that the maturing 
from TRL1 to TRL9 ranges from 4 to 22 years [44]. The aircraft industry related table, found 
in Figure 3, shows there are significant differences in the timeline depending on the 
technological complicatedness of the system. In other words, the more simple systems without 
airworthiness testing mature in less time than the complicated onboard systems. When the 
simplest systems (ground-based flight control) are excluded, we can see the years to maturity 
is between 17-22 years. Moreover, the graph indicates the maturing occurs more or less 
intermittently. All programmes contain stages of both slow and rapid maturing, and these stages 
occur in different phases of the development curve. To sum up, the table needs to be interpreted 
with caution, but it can assist in drawing conclusions regarding the timeframe. 
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Figure 3: Aircraft Technology Readiness Level Timeline [44]. 
As said, in addition to historical data we can also scrutinise the maturing assessments conducted 
by other researchers. A TRL forecasting timeline can be found in a study carried out by the U.S 
National Academy of Sciences about technology development of unmanned ground vehicles 
(UGV) [43]. It has considered the maturing of three technologically different UGV’s, named 
Donkey, Wingman and Hunter-Killer (Figure 4). The study predicts that for the least 
complicated system it will take four years to mature from TRL4 to TRL6, while it will require 
six years for the more advanced system and 16 years for the most advanced UGV. These results 
confirm the fact that the timeline does correlate with the technological complexity.  
Figure 4: Forecasted UGV Technology Readiness Level Timeline [43]. 
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Since the DEW systems are complex and include novel electronics, they must be regarded as 
representatives of advanced technology, and thus we must apply the longer timelines in 
forecasting their maturity. Based on the aforementioned this thesis uses the timelines for 
maturing as illustrated in Figure 3 but excludes the timeline of the ground-based flight control 
systems. The exclusion rests on the assumption that DEWs are more complex systems than and 
cannot be developed in such a short time. 
3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
As many other future technologies, DEW or ray gun at the time was first envisaged in the 
science fiction literature. Probably the earliest description of such a weapon was made as early 
as in 1898 [30].  As new technological breakthroughs were accomplished for example in the 
form of X-rays and microwaves, the film industry introduced us with more and more directed 
energy weapons.  
In this chapter, an understanding of the directed energy weapon domain is gained by a thorough 
literature review. There are numerous different technologies utilised and researched within the 
field of directed energy weapons. Currently the DEW technologies include laser, maser and 
high power microwave/high power radio frequency (HPM/HPRF). However, based on 
thorough internet searches, only laser and HPM/HPRF can be now regarded as technologies 
capable of producing air defence weapons. Thus they are the technologies that this research 
focuses on. 
First, the DEW is defined for this research, and this is followed by exploring the technological 
fundaments and the boundaries of physics affecting the DEW together with the introduction of 
the current DEW technologies and systems employing these technologies. 
3.1. Defining Directed Energy Weapons 
Since some slightly different definitions of directed energy weapons could be found, a single 
definition to serve this research was needed. For this purpose, it was decided to adopt the 
definition of the US Department of Defense Joint Publication 1-02 (JP1-02). This is based on 
the fact that US is currently the leading developer of DEW technology.  
 
The JP1-02 defines directed energy as ‘an umbrella term covering technologies that relate to 
the production of a beam of concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic 
particles’ [75].  This definition indicates that no particular technology is excluded as long as it 
employs either concentrated electromagnetic energy or atomic or subatomic particles. In other 
words, DE encompasses entire frequency spectrum, depicted in Figure 5, from very low radio 
  18 
frequencies all the way to gamma radiation. It needs to be observed, however, that in weapon 
use some areas of the frequency spectrum are more useful than others and this brings us to the 
definition of Directed Energy Weapon. 
Figure 5: The Electromagnetic Spectrum [20]. 
 
Directed Energy Weapon is defined by JP1-02 as ’A weapon or system that uses directed energy 
to incapacitate, damage, or destroy enemy equipment, facilities, and personnel’[75]. As it is 
stated in the definition, a weapon needs to deliver an effect. To deliver an effect, there are some 
limitations regarding the used frequency. These restrictions are covered in the following sub-
chapters. On the other hand, the definition also includes incapacitation as an adequate effect. 
According to dictionary ‘incapacitate’ is a verb defined as: ‘prevent from functioning in normal 
way’ [64]. This leads to a need for this research to also include systems which may prosecute 
the target by taking an indirect approach.  
 
However, audio weapons, although fitting in the definition of DEW, are excluded. The 
exclusion is based on the assumption that audio weapons are incapable, even by indirect 
approach, to incapacitate, damage, or destroy air vehicles.  
 
Another term that is often seen in discussions regarding DEW is ‘non-kinetic weapon’. 
Although this term has several interpretations and definitions, it cannot be found in JP1-02. 
There may be several reasons why it has not been defined officially in JP1-02, which 
encompasses some 2500 entries, but it is likely to do with the confusion around the term. 
Although it may seem obvious in the beginning, the term was found to be a very tricky to define.  
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As an example a study conducted by Geneva Academy for International Humanitarian Law and 
Human Rights  states a non-kinetic-energy weapon as ‘one that threatens or inflicts harm to a 
person other than through the application to the human body of the energy that a bullet, 
fragment, or other projectile possesses due to its mass and motion’[13]. Based on this definition, 
and its further elaboration [Ibid.], all DEW are non-kinetic weapons although not all non-kinetic 
weapons are DEW. This definition, however, leaves us with open questions regarding other 
aspects of non-kinetic.  
 
For instance, when we familiarise ourselves with a list of families of weapons presented by US 
Navy 107[77]. Based on this classification kinetic weapons form one family of weapons while 
the other families are potential energy, directed energy, chemical and biological. According to 
this definition, all other than kinetic could be regarded as non-kinetic. Although this definition 
is logical unfortunately, it is not universal, and furthermore, it is noteworthy that there are DEW, 
lasers and particle beam weapons in particular, which can be seen to deliver kinetic energy to 
the target and thus considered as kinetic weapons [81]. Because of this, some directed energy 
weapons can be regarded as kinetic while some fall under non-kinetic. Therefore we cannot 
explicitly state that DEW’s are non-kinetic weapons.    
 
This confusion has led to a suggestion to band kinetic energy, potential energy, and some 
directed energy weapons together and call everything else non-kinetic [Ibid.]. This view is 
useful in the context where weapon systems are discussed from a technical point of view and 
thus it is the one adopted by this dissertation too. Hence this paper does not categorise DEW 
under kinetic or non-kinetic weapons. This categorization depends on the particular DE 
technology since the family of DEW consists both kinetic and non-kinetic 
systems/technologies.  
3.2. Laser 
The laser is one of the two most prominent and likely DE technology to provide air defence 
effectors, and in fact, many demonstrators already exist. This chapter introduces the basics of 
laser technology in general while the primary focus is on laser’s military applications. However, 
the general principles of laser physics are valid regardless of the domain the laser is 
implemented in. Thus the fundaments remain the same although the requirements, e.g. for 
power, range, propagation, can differ drastically from domain to another [23] [51]. 
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Lasers have been utilized successfully in numerous different areas of business and science as 
well as in the military for several decades. The range of applications is vast and ever expanding 
as new enhancements to current technology are introduced. Many of our daily appliances make 
use of lasers including remote controllers, motion sensors, bar code readers and DVD players, 
just to name a few. Naturally, the output power of these apparatus is minimal, and as such we 
may not even consider them as lasers. On the other end of the power spectrum we have 
industrial lasers capable of cutting and drilling, plastic, aluminium and steel. And somewhere 
in the middle, there are laser scalpels used for surgery. 
There are two common nominators for all high power civilian lasers. Firstly there is the short 
range. The majority of the applications are used for distances less than 10 centimetres. Many 
are effective only if employed in distances less than a few centimetres or even millimetres. 
Despite there are few exceptions to this, in general, all the civilian lasers are very short range 
lasers. The other common nominator is that they are designed for indoor use where the ambient 
conditions are somewhat stable. As they are designed for extremely short distances and stable 
ambient conditions, they have enormous problems operating if either the distance is increased 
or atmospheric conditions are changed. We will cover reasons for these phenomena later in this 
chapter. 
3.2.1. Principles of Laser 
 
The term laser is an acronym meaning ‘Light Amplification by Stimulated Emission of 
Radiation’, and the principle was first introduced in 1959 [25]. Next, the principles and the 
unique features of the laser are discussed focusing on lasers applicability as a weapon. 
The fundamental principle of the laser is based on the notion of spontaneous emission. In 
spontaneous emission, an excited state laser-active atom or ion may after some time decay into 
a lower energy level. This results in released energy in the form of a photon. In stimulated 
emission, this process is stimulated by incoming photons. In that case, a photon is emitted into 
the mode of the incoming photon. In effect, the power of the incoming radiation is amplified. 
This is the physical basis of light amplification in laser amplifiers and laser oscillators [51] [18]. 
This process is depicted in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Laser Light Amplification [52]. 
For stimulated emission to provide an adequate amount of energy, the stimulation requires a 
process which is performed by a laser oscillator. It consists a gain medium, also called laser 
medium, which is either gas, solid or liquid and an energy input and an optical feedback 
mechanism. The optical feedback is usually generated by two mirrors on each end of the 
oscillator. On the other end, there is a fully reflective mirror whereas on the opposing end the 
mirror is partially reflective allowing some of the emission through [51]. A laser oscillator is 
portrayed in Figure 7. 
Figure 7: Principle of Laser Oscillator [12]. 
Laser medium’s task is to add energy to the amplified light, and thus some energy must be 
provided to it. The laser medium is supplied with energy through a process called pumping. 
Pumping typically involves electrical current (electrical pumping) or a light input (optical 
pumping). For the amplification process to occur there is a requirement to maintain the majority 
of atom/ion population in the upper laser level. In other words, more laser-active ions are in the 
upper state than in the lower state. 
  22 
This condition, where the majority of atoms/ions are in the upper laser level, is called population 
inversion [39] [18]. Population inversion is a state which differs from thermal equilibrium: in 
thermal equilibrium, the population of the lower level always exceeds the population of the 
lower level, and a positive net gain is not possible. Sometimes, population inversion is formally 
described as a state with a negative temperature. In many cases, it is achieved by optical 
pumping [51]. 
With an oscillator by itself, one can also reach very high power levels. The amount of 
amplification within an oscillator increases sharply with the distance travelled through the laser 
medium. It follows that we can increase the power by increasing the length of the laser medium. 
However, there some issues with that, specifically regarding linewidth, pulse duration and beam 
quality [51]. Hence there are systems, especially high power systems, incorporating amplifier/s. 
It follows that the use of amplifiers is often the case with laser weapons where high power is 
paramount.  
Although laser oscillator does, in fact, amplify light, it is not regarded as an amplifier within 
laser terminology. A laser amplifier, also called Master Oscillator Power Amplifier (MOPA), 
is a separate apparatus to further amplify the seed laser. This process is illustrated in Figure 8. 
In the picture, the seed laser is produced by the oscillator which is then amplified to reach a 
higher power. There are a different kind of amplifiers utilising different technologies, and some 
laser applications utilise a number of amplifiers to reach the desired output power [51]. 
Figure 8: Principle of Master Oscillator Power Amplifier [12]. 
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As was discussed, the laser has been found very useful in numerous domains and applications. 
This is the result of laser’s unique features. The unique features of laser include [18]: 
1. Directionality 
 
Contrary to normal visible light laser light has a unique character of radiating to a particular 
direction. Hence there hardly is any divergence of emission and energy can be transferred 
efficiently and power losses are minimal. [23] 
 
2. Monochromaticity 
 
The linewidth (bandwidth) of the laser is extremely narrow compared to other light sources. 
Narrow bandwidth means the range of frequency is narrow which results in single spectral 
colour. This does not, however, mean all lasers operate at the same frequency. On the 
contrary, a laser device can operate in any spectral frequency, and some lasers can even 
change the frequency. [23] 
 
3. Coherence  
 
Coherence is a vital concept in optics and is strongly related to the ability of light to exhibit 
interference effects. Light is called coherent when the waves have a constant relative phase. 
Lasers have the potential for generating beams with very high spatial coherence, and this is 
perhaps the most fundamental difference between laser light and radiation from other light 
sources. [51] 
 
3.2.2. Types of High Energy Lasers 
 
In general high energy lasers (HEL) are categorised into four classes. These are Solid State 
Laser (SSL), Dye/Liquid Laser, Gas Laser and Free Electron Laser (FEL). These categories 
incorporate lasers utilising different kinds of technology and laser medium each with unique 
characteristics [33]. These laser types and their characteristics are discussed next. 
Solid State Lasers: 
Solid state lasers utilise, as the name suggests, solid lasing media like ceramic or glass-like 
solids. The very first laser was, in fact, a solid state laser. The SSLs are further subcategorized 
into four groups; watt class, bulk lasers, fibre lasers and disk lasers. The watt class are the most 
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commonly used lasers both in civilian and military applications. The military applications 
include, for example, range finders and laser radars. This technology is very mature and 
somewhat pervasive.  
Bulk laser refers to a big lasing medium as opposed to the fibre lasers non-bulky fibre lasing 
medium [51]. Bulk lasers can reach over 100 kW output powers. Multiple bulk lasers can be 
combined and aligned together to provide higher power. Fibre laser, on the other hand, utilises 
a long optical fibre to generate the laser output. Fibre laser enables smaller size and costs 
compared to bulk lasers. Further benefits include better heat radiation and overall heat 
generation due to better wall-plug efficiency [1]. Multiple fibre lasers can be connected to 
increase output power too, and a single fibre laser can currently produce outputs of 
approximately 10kW. The fourth class are the disk lasers which have been named according to 
the very thin disk they use as the lasing medium. They compete with fibre lasers and possess 
similar advantages with them. However, disk lasers also possess features that cannot be reached 
by current fibre laser technology [51]. 
Dye/Liquid Lasers: 
A dye laser uses a dye as the lasing medium.  Organic molecules in liquid form compose the 
basis for most laser dyes, albeit solid and vapour laser dyes exist. Since the dye is in most cases 
liquid, Dye lasers are also referred as Liquid lasers [51]. The terms are, however, not 
interchangeable, since Liquid laser explicitly refers to liquid only. It results that, the liquid laser 
is a sub-category of Dye lasers. As far as weapon solutions are concerned the main feature of 
Dye lasers is the ability to exhibit a broad gain bandwidth. This enables wavelength tunability 
which can be used to mitigate weather related energy attenuation. 
Gas Lasers: 
There is a variety of different gas laser types. Chemical lasers use energy-liberating reactions 
of chemicals in their gas phase. Their characteristics include massive size and weight as well 
as laborious and challenging fuel management [33]. The fuel management issues derive from 
the use of the highly toxic chemical. Currently, chemical lasers are the only type of laser that 
has been able to produce very high powers ranging from several hundreds of kilowatts to a 
megawatt [1]. In spite of the high power, the chemical lasers’ deficiencies are currently viewed 
insurmountable and thus majority of military chemical laser programmes have been cancelled.  
However, in spite of the problems encountered by chemical lasers, there is another gas laser 
type that the military domain is now looking into. A promising development path has been 
opened by implementing vapour metal laser technology. It has been suggested that alkali-
vapour laser's high efficiency and can be combined with commercially available diode arrays.  
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This is seen to provide accelerated maturing to tactical systems, with superior mass-to-power 
ratios compared to current laser systems [36] [38].  
Free Electron Lasers: 
Free electron lasers are the possible future technology of laser weapons. The technology is 
currently very immature and is assessed to sit between TRL 2 and 3 [33]. FEL systems are 
massive in size, and their current demonstrated output power is in the 20kW range. Their 
positive features include a potential for very high power and the ability to tune their beams to 
different wavelengths. The tuning ability is something of high interest in the military 
applications as the propagation window fluctuates and the FEL could compensate this by being 
able to follow the window. 
3.2.3. Laser as an Air Defence Weapon 
 
There are numerous attributes that an air defence effector must possess. As for the purposes and 
scope of this research, we focus on the laser system’s ability to inflict desired effects to the 
target. These effects are related to the amount of energy delivered to the target system. Since 
aerial targets are fast movers in nature the targets exposure time is in many cases very limited. 
As there is a limited timeframe in which the required energy must be delivered to the target, 
there is a need for very high power. Furthermore, as the size and form of aerial targets range 
from mini/micro UAS to fighter jets and beyond, the effectors’ output power requirements are 
target dependable. The following table gives a rough idea of the necessary power in relation to 
the target. It does not by any means give exact figures but provides the reader rough estimates 
of the necessary power. Based on the table, this study assumes the threshold power for downing 
manned aircraft is 500kW. 
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Table 3: Power Requirements for Different Target Types [20]. 
The table indicates that should the laser be able to engage all current air defence targets there 
is an output power requirement ranging from 10 kilowatts to several megawatts. All of the 
output powers stated in the table are, nonetheless, considered very high although there is no 
universally agreed definition what exactly is a high-power laser [51]. 
As said, the table is very general in nature, and variables like range are stated ambiguously only 
indicating that the power requirement increases when range increases. Range does come with 
other issues too, some of the most significant being the beam quality and the tracking accuracy. 
We can draw some conclusions of the range related issues by the following example of 
soldering lasers.  
Since civilian high-power soldering lasers generally operate in distances of a less than few 
centimetres the beam quality is not a factor, but it becomes one when remote welding is in 
question [39]. And in remote welding, we are talking about distances of only 1-2 metres. So it 
is evident that beam quality is paramount in air defence scenarios where the ranges are 1000+ 
metres. Furthermore, the target of the welding laser (welded object) is stationary, which is not 
the case in air defence scenario. Thus accurate tracking is required to hold the beam tightly in 
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the same spot, and this understandably gets trickier with distance, also keeping in mind that the 
intention is to engage a moving and possibly manoeuvring target.  
Whereas power output is a significant factor it is by no means most important. As the term, 
HEL suggests it is the amount of energy what matters. Hence we cannot derive lasers 
effectiveness based on power, but we need to find out the fluence of the laser. Fluence is the 
amount of energy concentrated in a given area over a particular distance. Its most common units 
are J / cm2 (joules per square centimetre) [51]. To give the perspective of applicable fluence 
values, it requires a fluence of 5000J/cm² to penetrate a 3mm thick aluminium plate whereas 
optical sensors can be damaged by as low fluences as 10J/cm²[57].  
3.2.4. Laser Weapons under Development 
 
As was said there are numerous military applications making use of a laser. Laser technology 
has proliferated all over the spectrum of military operations, and some applications have been 
around for decades. As an example, the military utilises lasers for range finding, target 
designation, sensor dazzling and as sights. Alongside with the supporting tasks mentioned the 
military has been very keen in developing lasers to perform as weapons. This development has 
led to some promising concepts, and several actual high energy laser (HEL) demonstrators have 
been showcased over the course of the years. Already in 1990, a HEL system was able to down 
missiles and supersonic vehicles. This system, however, known as Mid-Infrared Advanced 
Chemical Laser (MIRACL), had several drawbacks including size, cost, propagation problems 
and risk related to hazardous chemicals [42]. The same issues were factors also for other laser 
systems that have demonstrated high power engagement capability [65]. These systems include 
Tactical High Energy Laser (THEL) developed by US Army and USAF programme called 
Airborne Laser (ABL). They all utilised chemicals as a laser medium which meant they were 
able to reach high power but suffered from problems related to the highly toxic chemicals. All 
this meant there was still a long way to an operational system.   
Following the fundamental deficiencies of chemical lasers the research and development efforts 
are currently mostly directed to Solid State (SSL), and Free Electron Lasers (FEL) and the 
majority of military grade lasers in demonstrator phase are SSL’s. FEL is the technology of 
tomorrow, and currently, they are hugely expensive and large.  
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A selection of the most prominent ongoing and cancelled laser weapons programmes are 
presented in Table 4. The table is a compilation of the most interesting systems, arranged in 
order of the type of laser, describing current status and goal of development programmes based 
on several sources [14][20][33][50]. Some detailed information has been added to the table 
using other sources too. These references can be found within the table. The table is not 
exhaustive but provides an overview of the current situation and allows further analysis to be 
made regarding for example technology, maturity, timescale and possible targets. 
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Programme Name Laser 
type 
Purpose Status Goal 
FEL (Free Electron Laser) FEL Technology maturing 
programme 
Early stage 
technology 
programme MIT & 
Arizona state [2] 
1MW+, 1 meter 
length, 
ABL (Airborne Laser) Gas Strategic missile defence Cancelled Several MW’s, 
hundreds of km 
range 
ATL (Advanced Tactical 
Laser) 
Gas Gunship (AC-130) A/G 
weapon 
Cancelled 100kW+ 
DPAL (Diode Pumped Alkali 
Laser) 
Gas Strategic missile defence, 
ballistic missiles in boost 
phase 
20-30kW, 20-
30kg/kW 
1MW+, 2kg/kW [38] 
HELLADS (High Energy 
Liquid Laser Air Defense 
System) [61][31] 
Liquid 
(Dye) 
Air Force, A/G, self-protection Developmental, 
entering field trials 
150kW+, weight less 
than 5kg/kW 
GBAD DE OTM (Ground 
Based Air Defence Directed 
Energy On The Move) [48] 
N/A Integration of several systems 
to one complete weapon 
system. 
Field trials in 2017 UAS engagement 
capability for 
expeditionary forces 
(Marines). 30-50 kW. 
HELE/LWM (High Energy 
Laser Effector/Laser Weapon 
Module) [54] 
N/A Rheinmetall’s self-financed 
technology programme 
Developmental, 
Demonstrator 
3x10kW. 
Successful 
engagement of 
UAV and RAM 
 
TLS (Tactical Laser System) 
[7] 
N/A Ship self-protection. UAS, 
light targets 
10kW 
demonstrator in 
2011. 
 
LDEW (Laser Directed 
Energy Weapon) [72] 
N/A UK MOD funded programme 
for a capability demonstrator 
Started 1/2017 Demonstrator in 
2019. Possibly 
leading to in service 
weapon in mid-2020. 
Gamma [46] SSL Northrop Grumman self-
financed technology 
programme 
Initial test in 2012 
13,3kW units that 
can be combined 
 
HEL MD (High Energy Laser 
Mobile Demonstrator) [26]. 
Follow-on programme called 
HELMTT 105[53] 
SSL Proof of principle for mobile 
GBAD DE for Army. HELMTT 
will use RELI’s laser system. 
successful test of 
10kW 
50-100kW. G-RAMM 
capability. 
MLD (Maritime Laser 
Demonstrator) [47] 
 
SSL Ship self-protection Demonstrator 
utilizing JHPSSL 
in maritime 
conditions. 105kW 
in 2009. 
No stated project 
goal. 300-600kW is 
considered 
achievable. 
JHPSSL (Joint High Power 
Solid state Laser) 
SSL Joint technology programme. 
Leveraged by Navy in MLD. 
105kW in 2009. 
 
 
Excalibur SSL/Fibre Scalable multipurpose laser 
system for air vehicles (A/G, 
self-defence, missile defence 
Developmental, 
demo in 2013 
100kW+ [41] 
 
LAWS (LAser Weapon 
System) [47] 
SSL/Fibre Ship self-protection Prototype 30kW, 
installed on USS 
Ponce 
100kW+ IOC stated 
for 2020-2021 
RELI (Robust Electric Laser 
Initiative) [69] 
SSL/Fibre Laser programme for US 
Army and Air Force operated 
platforms 
 Weight less than 
7kg/kW, 30% wall-
plug efficiency,  
100kW+ 
Table 4: Laser Weapon Programmes. 
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3.3. High Power Radio Frequency Weapons 
Another prominent DEW technology is High Power Radio Frequency (HPRF) weapons. They 
are also commonly referred as High Power Microwave (HPM) weapons, High Power 
Electromagnetic Weapons (HPEW) or non-nuclear Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) weapons. 
These terms are more or less interchangeable [20][57][8], and this thesis adopts High Power 
Radio Frequency (HPRF) as the used term. 
In simple terms, HPRF weapons transmit RF energy to affect the target. The effects depend on 
the power, distance and the target itself and in some cases the operator can decide the effects 
by choosing the desired engagement power. The ultimate design goals of HPRF weapons range 
from crowd control to downing UAS or disabling electronic devices. As this thesis is on air 
defence, we will focus systems capable, or designed to be, of prosecuting air targets. 
3.3.1. Principles of High Power Radio Frequency Weapons 
 
There are two categories of HPRF weapons; an HPRF weapon system and an HPRF munition. 
An HPRF weapon consists of a power source, transmitter and an antenna. The apparatus sends 
energy towards the target, and the target is either permanently incapacitated, or its ability to 
conduct its mission is prevented. [57] 
An HPRF munition also referred as an e-bomb or microwave munition, is a munition 
encompassing a conventional explosive material which primary task is to provide energy for 
the embedded microwave device. The device transforms the energy into high power RF 
radiation to incapacitate nearby electronics. Speculations state that HPRF munitions, 900kg 
bombs, were used already in the first Gulf War [32]. Open literature does not mention air 
defence variant of HPRF munitions. However, this is one theoretical future development once 
adequate power outputs can be reached with anti-aircraft size munitions.   
The effect on an air target can be obtained either by molecular heating or electrical stimulation. 
Molecular heating is based on heating the target to the point where its fuel or explosive payload 
will explode or set on fire. The desired effects can also be reached by degrading the air vehicles 
structures due to intense heat. Molecular heating requires extensive dwell time on target, and 
thus it is not very likely approach against fast moving air targets.  
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Electrical stimulation, however, requires far less power and dwell time thus being more feasible 
for air defence engagements. In electrical stimulation, microwave energy connects with any 
material conducting electricity and stimulates electron flow in the material. This electron flow 
produces transient currents and voltages. Target’s electrically conductive materials act like little 
antennae gathering the high power. Transient currents interfere with the normal operation of 
electrical components, inducing specious signals that confuse the system or even damage 
sensitive components. 
US Air Force Research Laboratory has divided the effects of HPRF weapon into four 
categories: upset, lockup, latch-up and burnout [20]. These are introduced below. 
Upset is a temporary alteration of the electrical state of one or more nodes in such a way that 
they no longer function normally. Once the signal is removed, however, the normal function 
returns with no permanent effects. Jamming is an example of this type of effect, where a sensor 
might lose lock because of interference.  
Lockup produces the same effects as upset, but an electrical reset is required to regain 
functionality, even after the signal is removed. If a computer were to freeze after exposure to 
an RF signal so that it had to be rebooted, this would be an example of lockup. 
Latch-up is an extreme form of lockup in which a node is permanently destroyed, or electrical 
power is cut off to the node. A fuse blowing or transistors failing on a circuit board due to 
overloads from microwave radiation are two such examples.  
Burnout is the physical destruction of a node where the current becomes so great that 
conductors actually melt. This usually occurs within smaller wires or at junction nodes where 
multiple wires come together and often involves electrical arcing. The damage to household 
electronics caused by a lightning strike is an example of burnout.  
In broad terms, burnout requires, depending on the component class, from 1000 to 10000 times 
more power than upset. Burnout power levels are in the 100W region whereas upset can be 
accomplished with 0,1W or less [57].    
All of the effect categories are purposeful in military applications. In a GBAD scenario, they 
all can oppose a precision attack by disrupting or disabling either the weapon system or the 
platform itself. The more powerful effects like burnout and latch-up are most sought for as they 
will inflict permanent damage to the target. This is specifically the case when the target is the 
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platform since both burnout and latch-up will require laborious repair and maintenance keeping 
it grounded for a very long time.  
Whichever effect discussed above is sought the signals transmitted by HPRF weapon must 
reach vulnerable components of the target. These components can be reached directly via 
targets sensors, such as the antenna or seeker head, or indirectly through the target's body. The 
direct method is referred as ‘front-door coupling’ and the indirect as ‘back-door coupling’. The 
principles of the methods are depicted in Figure 9. [57] 
Figure 9: Principles of Front-door and Back-door coupling [57]. Adapted from [3]. 
Front-door coupling is most efficient when the target system’s receiver is operating in the same 
bandwidth as the weapon. This is because target’s antenna is designed and tuned to receive 
signals of particular bandwidth and thus it is very susceptible to malicious signals of the same 
bandwidth. Although in general, the inflicted damage has a direct relation to the power of the 
HPRF signal this is not applicable when targeting radar systems. This results from radar’s built-
in limiting devices protecting the receiver from radar’s transmitter.[57] 
As the name suggests, back-door coupling takes advantage of HPRF signal’s ability to penetrate 
the skin of the target system. Albeit the skin provides some protection itself, it is still possible 
to inflict desirable effects to target’s electronics. Once inside the target system, HPRF signals 
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cause drastic issues for the circuitry. Due to target’s protective casing, back-door coupling 
requires more power than front-door coupling.[57] 
3.3.2. HPRF Weapons under Development 
 
The HPRF programmes identified by the literature review are presented in Table 5. It is 
noteworthy that publicly available information about HPRF weapons is limited and general in 
nature. The number of systems mentioned is only five compared to some 20 laser system 
programmes introduced earlier. It also became evident air defence has not been the developers’ 
main interest as only one HPRF system was designed for downing air vehicles. All four 
identified systems are designed for other purposes than air defence. Nonetheless, if they can 
mature the technology itself, it may be transferrable to future air defence systems. 
 
We can only speculate the reasons what comes to the little number, prominence and publicity 
of HPRF systems/programmes found. However, there are sources speculating that although the 
theoretical principles and applicability were established several decades ago, there just is too 
many technological hurdles to be surpassed [79].  
 
Programme Name Purpose Status Goal 
Active Denial System[20] Counter-
personnel/Crowd 
control 
Deployed to operation 
in 2010. Never used 
in operations. 
Withdrawn from field 
and not in use. 
Controlling rioters/crowds from a 
distance of some hundreds of 
meters without inflicting 
permanent damage. Goal met. 
NIRF (Neutralizing IED’s with 
Radio Frequencies)[20] 
IED neutralization Unknown.  Incapacitating IED electronics 
from a safe distance. 
MAXPOWER[20][6] IED neutralization Unknown.  Incapacitating IED electronics 
from a safe distance. 
CHAMP (Counter-electronics 
High-powered Advanced 
Missile Project)[20][60] 
Incapacitation of 
electronic 
targets/systems 
Flight test in 2012 
with engagement of 
soft electronic targets. 
Deliver microwaves from an 
aircraft or missile, effectively 
walloping a target’s data and 
electronic subsystems. 
HPM Demonstrator [29]0 Counter UAS Engagement test in 
2013. Successful 
downing of small 
UAVs. 
Unknown. 
Table 5: HPRF Weapon Programmes. 
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3.4. Advantages and Disadvantages of DEW 
As it is with all weapon system, DEWs also come with both positive and negative features. In 
this chapter, we look into the positive and negative features of DEW. These encompass both 
technological attributes as well as notions related to usability and deployability. First, we look 
at the positive characteristics and then familiarise ourselves with the negative ones accompanied 
with technological issues identified by the literature. 
3.4.1. Strengths of DEW 
 
Collateral damage reduction is an advantage which is often mentioned regarding DEW. Both 
laser and HPRF systems can engage the targeted system with a remarkable accuracy and since 
there is no kinetic force the proximity of friendly forces is not an issue. Furthermore, DEW’s 
can provide an option for non-lethal engagement by offering ‘scalability’ of effect. 
Infinite magazine; this term refers the DEW’s ability to engage targets without a need for 
reloading, and it is often seen advantageous feature especially in countering swarming attacks 
and salvo attack [20]. DEW’s can fire as long as their electricity supply is working. 
Another positive characteristic is that the effector beam or signal is travelling speed of light 
[33]. This is advantageous in countering salvo/swarm attacks as the system can engage 
numerous targets in a short period. This is because there is no delay in waiting that the 
ammunition or missile reaches the target before a new target can be engaged. Furthermore, 
rapid engagement leaves little or no time for countermeasures. 
Engagement price of DEW is extremely low, it only requires electricity but no projectiles. 
Whereas state-of-the-art GBAD ammunition cost tens of thousands euros per burst and missiles 
from hundred thousand to several million, the price of a DEW engagement costs approximately 
one euro. Not only are there the obvious saving benefits but also the fact that DEW’s enable 
engagement of low cost targets and turns the cost ratio of countering swarming/salvo attacks 
favourable for the defender.  
HPRF weapons allow engagement of several targets simultaneously with a single system. This 
is possible because of the relatively big divergence angle of HPRF transmitter widening the 
beam radius to several hundred meters in a distance of 2 km [33]. The wide beam also means 
less strict requirements for target tracking which is quite the opposite in laser’s case. In addition 
this feature could also enable engagement of stealth targets without a precise track. 
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Silence is another advantage the DEW possess. Depending on the mission type and scenario it 
is seen as very interesting feature as it enables covert operations [31]. Silence is also 
advantageous feature in many other uses too; for example, the current C-RAM systems used 
for camp protection can cause hearing damages to bystanders as they are unaware the system 
will fire. This will not be an issue with DEW systems. 
The widespread use of DEWs lower the logistics burden. The required effort to supply a DEW 
with fuel is much less than what is required to replenish ammunition for a gun system. 
Furthermore, there is no need to upkeep ammunition storages or worry about the aging of 
ammunition. 
3.4.2. Weaknesses of DEW 
 
Size, weight and power (SWaP). Based on several factors laser systems currently struggle with 
SWaP related issues. Although SWaP- issues are a factor with many new systems and 
technologies, DEW, and laser, in particular, have numerous SWaP concerns to surmount. The 
reasons behind these issues are discussed next. 
Power requirements. Due to current laser wall-plug efficiency of around 20% [33], one requires 
an input power of 500kW to produce a 100kW laser beam. Based on the power requirements 
presented in Table 3 an input power of some 2-5 MW is required for engaging aircraft size 
targets. The power requirement is one of the reasons why currently most advanced laser systems 
are installed on ships. And even then there are major limitations regarding power. 
 
The current power distribution system of battleships is not able to provide enough power for 
the high power laser systems. The modern US Navy combat ships could accommodate a 
maximum of 100kW laser system in battle conditions [47]. In the future, when the all-electric-
drive has become a standard in battleships like the Zumwalt-class already has, this issue will be 
surmounted [28] [27]. The Zumwalt-class with some 58MW of power available [50] for weapon 
systems will be joined by at least the future Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers which are 
initially designed to provide 300% more power than the current Nimitz-class [50]. This will 
most likely be a new norm for the future combat ships.  
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Another SWaP related topic is the weight. Today’s DEW systems’ mass-to-power ratios are in 
the ballpark of 35-55kg/kW meaning that a Megawatt class laser apparatus would weigh at least 
35 tonnes and a 100kW device some 3,5tons. The latter is not a big problem as long as the 
desired effect is reached with 100kW. But as we can see from Table 3, 100 kW will suffice in 
close-range UAV engagements only. There are, however, big expectations regarding the 
development of lighter systems and the targets for mass-to-power ratios are as low as 2kg/kW 
as can be seen in Figure 10. 
Figure 10: SWaP Progression Plans of US Missile Defence Agency [67]. 
Along with to the mentioned weight issues comes the size issues. Accommodation of a laser 
system requires new design even for ships [33]. Again this is an even bigger problem when 
aircraft or mobile ground systems are in question. A reduction in size will eventually follow as 
the technology evolves but this will take time. 
Heat is a direct result of poor wall-plug efficiency. Since some 80% of electrical power is 
wasted in the process of generating a laser beam, there is a need for expensive and space-
consuming cooling unit [33] [20]. This is a factor especially with ground-based systems as well 
as with airborne systems. This likely is another reason why today’s laser weapons are mostly 
shipborne. Another issue resulting from heat is the systems high IR signature which can be a 
major problem in the battlefield.  Hence it is not enough only to solve the cooling; one must 
also retain the systems IR signature at an acceptable level.  
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Due to the extreme narrowness of laser beam precision tracking is vital to provide desired 
effect. Without an exact and stable tracking, big part of the beam’s energy is lost as it is not 
concentrated on a single point [57]. Precision tracking increases both size and complexity of 
the system. It is noteworthy that this applies to laser systems only as HPRF use a wide beam as 
mentioned earlier. 
Some literature considers collateral damage and fratricide as a possible worry when DEW are 
used [17] [33]. This is mainly related to HPRF which cannot differentiate between hostile and 
friendly systems but affects all electronic systems in the direction of the signal. 
Both HEL and HPRF require a line of sight to the target, otherwise, the energy cannot reach the 
target. This becomes an issue when engaging a target beyond the horizon and also when using 
HEL to engage low flying targets partially obscured by obstacles such as trees or buildings. The 
line of sight issue can be mitigated with relay (airborne) mirrors, but this further complicates 
the system [20]. 
Range limitations are of course scenario and requirement dependable. However, as we focus 
on GBAD, there is a need to engage targets at least in the 5km range and beyond. This is 
currently a challenge, as demonstrated ranges are less than 3km. Furthermore, effective range 
is heavily dependable on the targets aspect angle (see Table 3).  
Currently, DEWs suffer from weather limitations because certain atmospheric conditions decay 
wave energy [33] [57]. This especially applies to HEL, but HPRF does not come without 
problems either.  Technological advances will most likely overcome this issue partially, by 
introducing wavelength tunable laser systems. 
3.5. Recent DEW Maturity Surveys 
Since the DEW’s have been coming of age for a few years now, there are some unclassified 
polls that have covered the maturity of DEW in the years to come. Two of these are presented 
next. 
A company named Defence IQ conducted a poll before an annual DE conference which the 
company organises. Although the survey can be regarded as a conference advertisement and 
does not include year estimates, it does provide some insight of DEW topics. The survey was 
sent to more than 300 people, but the report does not state the number of respondents. This is a 
fact that should be kept in mind when the answer percentages are viewed. Out of the 
respondents, 31% were military, and 25% represented the industry. In the following, the results 
of two of the most interesting questions related to this thesis are introduced. [17] 
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In the first question the respondents were given a set of factors and asked to identify biggest 
obstacles for DE systems’ proliferation. It is not clear how many factors the respondents were 
allowed to choose but it was more than one as the total percentage exceeds 100. The answers, 
illustrated in Figure 11 reveal five factors that were regarded most likely. These are 1) user 
safety/fratricide concerns 2) lack of understanding of integration with legacy systems, 3) lack 
of understanding of DE capabilities/requirements, 4) lack of funding and 5) lack of 
technological reliability (e.g. blooming).  
Figure 11: Results of Defence IQ Survey Question 1[17]. 
The other question regarding DEW maturity in Defence IQ’s survey asked the respondents to 
choose the most important technological issues. The answers to this question are depicted in 
Figure 12. The three issues identified as most important were: 1) collateral damage risks, 2) 
inability to control blooming and 3) usability in inclement weather. Again the numbers behind 
the percentage are not stated. Thus we cannot assess the validity as such.  
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Figure 12: Results of Defence IQ Survey Question 2 [17]. 
The second study was made for Center for New American Security by Ben Fitzgerald and 
Kelley Sayler in 2014. This study asked DEW maturity related questions from a total of 1019 
participants, of which 71% had experience in the national security realm and 45% were either 
serving or retired military. The poll was conducted in 2014 and had an average of 340 
respondents. The study consists two DEW related questions which, together with the answer 
distribution, are presented and discussed next. [24] 
 
Figure 13: Answer Distribution of CNAS Poll DEW Question 1 [24]. 
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The distribution of answers, depicted in Figure 13, indicates some agreement. It should be noted 
that some of the replies seem to be missing as the sum is roughly 80% although it should be 
100%. Despite this discrepancy, we can draw some conclusions of the distribution of answers. 
The bar chart states, as an approximate since we do not have the exact figures available, that 
some 50% consider DE being fully integrated into stable military systems by 2034 while 30% 
assess it will happen later or never. Although we do not know what the missing 20% have 
answered, we can still conclude that the mean of answers seems to fall somewhere between 
years 2025-2035.  
However, the question itself is ambiguous and could have been interpreted differently by the 
respondents. As an example, the question asks to consider the situation when a ‘technology is 
no longer experiencing rapid change or growth’. This can be seen as a situation when DEW is 
fully mature and capable of engaging a wide portfolio of targets, but it also can be seen that 
DEW technology is fully mature and will no longer develop but is still incapable of providing 
a meaningful military effector. Furthermore, as for this thesis’ focus, we cannot derive 
conclusions regarding how the respondents regarded the maturity and capability of DEW in 
GBAD role. This implicitness is visible in the next question too. 
Figure 14: Answer Distribution of CNAS Poll DEW Question 2 [24]. 
The answer distribution of the second DEW related question in the CNAS study is shown in 
Figure 14. It should be noted that in this bar chart the results are shown in numbers of 
respondents not in percentages as was in the previous chart. The results indicate relatively 
strong confidence that directed energy weapons will be mature enough to be used by major 
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powers in combat to destroy either air or sea platform by 2030. Approximately 2/3 (229) of the 
respondents consider the scenario at least moderately likely, whereas 1/3 foresee the scenario 
unlikely. Again, as there is no further explanation of the type or size of the target to be 
destroyed, there are some equivocality issues with the results. It is impossible to assess what 
kind of target the respondents considered while answering and thus we cannot draw conclusions 
on how they perceive DEW ability to down manned aircraft size targets for example. 
Nonetheless, the results do indicate a relatively clear consensus that there will be fielded and 
deployed DEW systems by 2030. 
 
3.6. Conclusions of the Literature Review 
The scientific background supporting the DEWs, laser and HPRF in particular, is solid. Both 
technologies have been known and researched for at least half a century. This has resulted in a 
thorough understanding of the phenomena within and around the technologies. Moreover, both 
technologies are in widespread use throughout the civilian and military domains.  It follows that 
the question is not any longer about theory and concepts but about developing real life 
applications.  It is apparent that we will witness the introduction of more DE applications in the 
years to come and some of these breakthroughs may benefit the developers of weapon-grade 
applications too.  
 
It is evident that the DEWs are considered as potential prospects to increase future military 
capabilities. The money invested, the announcements given, the number of development 
programmes and the rise of new potential targets all speaks for the coming of DEWs. However, 
although some systems/technologies could be considered quite promising there are numerous 
issues remaining, and the history of DEWs point out that regardless of the effort and resources 
the obstacles may prove to be insurmountable. 
 
Currently, we are not even close to reaching adequate power and range to engage manned 
aircraft size targets, and this may remain a fact for a long time. Nonetheless, the current 
demonstrators do seem promising in countering small UAS, and this will likely be the primary 
task for the first operational systems. 
 
The insight gained through the literature review provides a good foundation for proceeding to 
following steps of this research and enables to compose valid and concise questionnaires for 
the Delphi rounds.  
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4. APPLICATION OF RESEARCH METHODS 
 
“Measure what is measurable, and make measurable what is not so.” 
 
Galileo Galilei (1564-1642) 
 
 
In this chapter, the selected research methods are applied to answer SQ2: ‘What is the maturity 
level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030?’ Before application each method it is first described, and 
the actual steps taken are explained in detail. This adds detail into the general scientific 
introduction of the methodology chapter and enables one to perform the tests again if necessary. 
 
4.1. The Delphi Rounds 
The implementation of the Delphi method was initiated by identifying possible participants for 
the panel. The idea was to have subject matter experts (SME) from three separate groups 
representing the scientific community, military professionals and defence industry. The goal 
was to have ten SMEs of each group, a total of 30 panellists. Based on the grouping the original 
intention was to identify possible differences in the replies of each group. This was thought to 
increase the validity of the results especially if significant deviation between the groups would 
be present.  
The SME identification process was performed using several methods. Firstly an exhaustive 
search was made utilising several different search engines to find papers concerning DEW. This 
method was used to pinpoint especially the representatives of the scientific community. The 
authors were then contacted via email and asked to participate in the panel. In addition, an 
attempt was made to find Academia representatives by contacting the experts interviewed or 
mentioned in the articles and papers on DEW. In total 15 authors, researchers and scientists 
were asked to participate. Out of that, only four replied and none was able to participate.  
Simultaneously the industry participants were sought by using both thesis supervisor’s and the 
author’s contacts. It was evident from the beginning that without correct contacts the defence 
industry would be difficult to reach. A total of 12 people in 10 companies were contacted. Based 
on publicly available sources, all the companies had an ongoing DEW- programme of their 
own. The majority of the contacts did not reply at all and the rest mainly rejected due to 
classification issues. However, four industry representatives agreed to participate. 
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Lastly, a number of military SMEs were contacted, some directly and some via Finnish Defence 
Attachés, and asked to participate. Mainly the same classification issues were given as a reason 
why so many military researchers declined from participating. However, a total of five military 
SMEs agreed to participate.  
The original idea of having active military officers represented in the study was disregarded as 
it was considered that they would mostly view the matter from an end users perspective. This 
decision was based on the fact that the deployment and operation of DEW effector are not part 
of the problem space for this study. This decision did not however, mean, that all officers would 
be excluded from the panel but that they would have to possess adequate knowledge of the 
maturity issues of DEW. As it is stated in Chapter 2.2, Delphi is not a poll; it is a process of 
aggregating SME opinions.  
In conclusion, the total number of panellist was 14 representing five different countries. Five 
of them were industry representatives, four military officers and five civil servants of armed 
forces. A total of 34 people were asked to participate leaving the success rate at 41%. Two main 
causes for such a low percentage were identified. Firstly the topic is extremely delicate, and 
various export restrictions and classification issues prevented the SMEs from participating. 
Secondly, the companies and the researchers are extremely busy professionals, and if there is 
nothing to be gained from their side, it is easy to turn down a request. Some even replied they 
would not participate unless a compensation were paid.  
On a further note, there was little to do to increase the number of panellists as practically all of 
the identified SMEs had been asked to participate. It was realised that an attempt was needed 
to identify more SMEs, but this was not possible as the numbers were limited. Furthermore, it 
was decided to retain in the originally defined SMEs and not to include a more general 
population such as military officers. After all Delphi’s validity is not based on the number of 
panellists but their expertise. The demographics of the panel is illustrated in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Demographics of the Delphi Panel. 
  44 
To make the panellists’ answering as painless as possible and to ease the burden of managing 
the data all the questionnaires were made using a software called Facilitate Pro. The software 
enables to design and manage queries as well as export statics in different formats. The user’s 
view of the first round is presented in Figure 15. It was considered necessary to provide a query 
which could be answered anywhere and anytime. An online query was thought to lower the 
threshold for answering and thus keeping the dropout rate low.  
Figure 15: User View of FacilitatePro. 
The Delphi process was designed as a whole keeping focus on answering the SQ2. The design 
process is depicted in Figure 16 below.  
Figure 16: Design Process of Delphi Rounds in this Research. 
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In the picture, the design phase is illustrated in blue consisting the stages and the required 
products provided by each Delphi round. The design of the Delphi was performed utilising a 
top-down approach where the first step was to establish supporting questions for sub-question 
2: ‘What is the maturity level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030?’ This was because it was 
determined that the Delphi question rounds should be more comprehensive than the mere 
question of whether DEWs are mature in 2030. To support the sub-question 2 the following 
supporting questions were composed: 
- What is the availability of GBAD DEW in 2030? 
- What are the DEW technologies/systems available in 2030? 
- What are the possible technological bottlenecks preventing DEW proliferation? 
- What are the non-technical issues that may prevent DEW proliferation? 
Based on the supporting questions a conclusion of round three products were made. From these 
products the outcomes of rounds two and one were derived which then led to the final design 
of the Delphi and the questionnaires, illustrated in orange, to be implemented in this research. 
To apply Delphi method properly, it is vital the previous rounds provide answers that can be, 
after analysis and possible clustering, used in the latter rounds as the baseline. As for this 
research, the goal of the first round was to provide three lists of attributes identified by the 
panellists and four sets of year estimates to be processed in the later rounds. In rounds two and 
three, the lists would be ranked (ranking type Delphi) and a consensus sought regarding the 
year estimates (forecast Delphi). The iteration of the lists was decided to be continued until one 
of the four stopping criteria would be met: 
1. Kendall’s W reaches 0.7 (Ranking questions). Meeting this criterion means there is a 
strong agreement among respondents and thus there is no need to continue iteration. 
2. Results of two successive rounds show no significant change. This means that the 
respondents are not likely to change their answers any longer and further iteration would 
be a waste of time. 
3. Dropout rate exceeds 40%. Higher dropout rate will compromise the validity of the 
results which would make continuing the iteration meaningless. 
4. We reach round three. Due to the strict deadline of the research, there would not be 
enough time for further iterations, and the analysis must be based on three rounds. 
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4.2. Round One of the Delphi Panel 
As said, the first question round of Delphi was designed to provide data for further iteration. 
The questions are shown in Table 7. The results of the open questions were clustered and sorted 
in alphabetical order to be used in the second round. A vague answer was first interpreted and 
then sent to the panellist to either confirm or rephrase. This is an important step to assure 
validity in the upcoming stages; only unequivocal lists should be sent for the iteration process 
as any speculation may interfere with the result. All the comments made by the panellists were 
collated in a matrix for possible future analysis.  
Questions Remarks 
Q1: Year when laser weapons will be commonly 
used by the military?  
Commonly= at least one Service of any nation’s armed forces has more than 10 
operational lasers in the field. 
Q2: List technical factors that currently influence 
laser weapons’ maturity. Justify briefly (1-2 
sentences) each of your answers. 
These factors can be either advancing or hindering the maturity. Include all factors 
regardless of their significance. Please be as specific as you can and avoid 
ambiguous answers e.g. “availability of components”. Instead, if possible, name 
the component you are referring to. 
Q3: Year when land based laser weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence?  
Consider specifically the ability of destroying fast moving manned aircraft size 
targets. NOT low power non-lethal engagements (e.g. sensor dazzlement).  
Q4: Year when HPRF weapons will be used by the 
military?  
 
Q5: List relevant technical factors that currently 
influence HPRF weapons’ maturity. Justify briefly 
(1-2 sentences) each of your answers. 
These factors can be either advancing or hindering the maturity. Include all factors 
regardless of their significance.  Please be as specific as you can and avoid 
ambiguous answers e.g. “availability of components”. Instead, if possible, name 
the component you are referring to. 
Q6: Year when land based HPRF weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence?  
Consider a situation where an airborne platform is forced to abort its mission 
after a being engaged by HPRF weapon.  
Q7: List relevant non-technical factors that 
influence/could have an impact on the 
proliferation of DEW.  Justify briefly (1-2 
sentences) each of your answers. 
These factors can be either advancing or hindering the proliferation. Include all 
factors regardless of their significance.  In this question “non-technical” refers to 
reasons of e.g. political, tactical, cultural, budgetary nature. 
Table 7: Round One Questions and Remarks. 
In total the first round consisted seven questions of which three were related to a year and four 
to features related to DEW maturity. It was regarded vital to include definitions to some of the 
otherwise ambiguous terms such as ‘commonly’ or ‘in use for air defence’. It was seen very 
likely the panellists would have defined these terms individually and there would have been 
problems in interpreting the answers and in some cases, these problems could have proved to 
be insurmountable thus shattering the basis of the complete research. For instance, the validity 
of the answers to question three would have been somewhat questionable if all answers would 
have been given based on personal definitions.  Furthermore, this would have made the Delphi 
iteration impossible as the panellists had answered to different questions.  
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It should be noted, however, that the definitions given could have also been different.  This is 
to say that before sending the first questionnaire a decision had to be made regarding the 
definitions. Let us look more in depth for question one as an example. There are an almost 
infinite number of other legitimate definitions for ‘commonly’.  Obviously, there are also some 
that are illegitimate due to absurdity too but let us focus on the legitimate ones. One could have 
inserted any number instead of ten as the number of operational systems. For example, 9 or 11 
would have been just as good as 10 and most likely would have returned the same answers. On 
the other hand, however, 21 or 71 could have altered the answers. For this study 10 was selected, 
not only because it is a nice even number, but foremostly because it was considered to express 
a ‘common enough’ employment especially when it was also stated that all the systems should 
be in use by single Armed Service. As was said 9 and 11 would have returned the same answers 
but on the other hand, 3 or 4 were considered too small numbers to describe common use. For 
this study, three ships equipped with lasers is not common use. On the other hand, if the number 
of systems in use would have been defined to be significantly more than ten, 50 for example, 
was considered to indicate a somewhat widespread use.  
As stated in the literature review, DEWs encompass several levels of use. For lasers, these 
levels range from dazzling of sensors/operators to destruction of the vehicle and for HPRF from 
upsetting the target’s electronics to physical destruction of targets components. Due to these 
tiers it seemed likely, there would be confusion regarding what is asked. If one is asked ‘Can X 
be done?’ the answer might be positive but if he is asked ‘Can X be done with 100 euros and 
within one hour?’ one could get an opposing answer. To mitigate this ambiguity a set of 
scenario-like definitions were created.  
It was decided to define ‘use of laser in air defence’ as the system’s capability to destroy fast 
moving manned aircraft size targets and ‘use of HPRF in air defence’ as the system’s capability 
to force an airborne target to abort its mission. The decision was based on the fact that this 
research is specifically focused on the GBAD applications of DEW as a whole without a 
specific area in mind (e.g. CRAM or counter-UAV). By introducing these ‘scenarios’ the 
questionnaire and the questions within were made as explicit as possible.  
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Answers to Q1 
 
Answers and their deviation for question 1:’Year when laser weapons will be commonly used 
by the military?’ are shown in the following diagram. 
 
 
Figure 17: Round 1 Q1 Answers. 
Answers to Q2 
 
The answers for Q2: ‘List technical factors that currently influence laser weapons’ maturity’ 
are shown in Table 8. A total of 28 factors were pointed out of which three were regarded as 
advancing and the rest 25 as challenges to be solved. These answers were clustered to remove 
duplicates and to provide a concise alphabetical list of factors to be rated in round 2. The 
clustered list is presented in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 8: Round 1 Q2 Answers. 
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Table 9: Round 1 Q2 Answers Clustered. 
 
Answers to Q3 
 
Answers and their deviation for question 3: ‘Year when land based laser weapons are mature 
enough to be used for air defence?’ are shown in the following diagram. 
 
 
Figure 18: Round 1 Q3 Answers. 
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Answers to Q4 
 
Answers and their deviation for question 4: ‘Year when HPRF weapons will be used by the 
military?’ are shown in the following diagram. 
 
 
Figure 19: Round 1 Q4 Answers. 
 
Answers to Q5 
 
The answers for Q5: ‘List relevant technical factors that currently influence HPRF weapons’ 
maturity’ are shown in Table 10. A total of 18 factors were pointed out of which 4 were regarded 
as advancing and the rest 14 as challenges to be solved. These answers were clustered to remove 
duplicates and to provide a concise alphabetical list of factors to be rated in round 2. The 
clustered list is presented in Table 11. 
 
 
Table 10: Round 1 Q5 Answers. 
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Table 11: Round 1 Q5 Answers Clustered. 
 
Answers to Q6 
  
Answers and their deviation for question 6: ‘Year when land based HPRF weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence?’ are shown in the following diagram. 
 
 
Figure 20: Round 1 Q6 Answers 
Answers to Q7 
 
The answers for Q7: ‘List relevant non-technical factors that influence/could have an impact 
on the proliferation of DEW’ are shown in Table 12. A total of 21 factors were identified by the 
SME’s. All of these were issues that could hinder the maturation of technology or the 
widespread use of the technology. These answers were clustered to remove duplicates and to 
provide a concise alphabetical list of factors to be rated in round 2. The clustered list consisting 
15 attributes is presented in Table 13. 
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Table 12: Round 1 Q7 Answers. 
 
 
Table 13: Round 1 Q7 Answers Clustered. 
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4.2.1. Summary of Round One 
 
A total of 10 respondents provided answers for round one. The goal of the round was achieved 
and the answers enabled to proceed to the next round. There was, however, an observation made 
that possibly not all the panellists had noted the definitions or mini-scenarios while considering 
their answers. This observation was based on the illogicality in answers to questions 1 and 3.   
It was observed that the results of questions 1 and 3 were unexpectedly stating that laser air 
defence applications against manned size targets would be in use at the same time or even 
sooner than lasers in general. Based on the literature review this was thought to have been quite 
the opposite as many papers state there are still many problems in effectively engaging manned 
aircraft in the near future whereas many laser weapons, although low power, are already in use 
or demonstrator phase. Two reasons for this were identified.  
Firstly the answers could be correct, and there were unprecedented factors that would require 
further research. One such factor identified was that the panellists would regard the non-
technical factors in Q7 so influential that they will prevent the proliferation although the 
technology would be mature enough. A decision was made that if this would be the case, then 
it would be investigated during round 2 analysis and addressed in round 3 questions.   
On the other hand, the answers could have been given without considering the definitions 
explained in the ‘Remarks’ column. The latter explanation was deemed to be more likely, and 
this was also supported by some of the free text answers provided. It was decided to emphasise 
the definitions in the upcoming rounds and monitor the answers to see if the phenomenon would 
persist. Nonetheless, the Delphi iteration should either remove the problem or make it even 
more prominent in the later rounds.   
4.3. Round Two of the Delphi Panel 
Based on the round one answers the round two questionnaire consisted the same three timeline 
assessment questions together with four lists of attributes to be ranked. An emphasis was made 
to highlight the important definitions for the panellist to minimise interpretation issues. The 
questionnaire also included a free text column, and the respondents were encouraged to justify 
their calls and comment the topics in general. The questions of Round 2 are illustrated in Table 
14. 
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The questionnaire was sent to all ten panellists who replied to round one. They were given two 
weeks to respond after which a reminder was sent to those who had not replied. A total of three 
reminders were sent and the total answering time was approximately eight weeks. Nevertheless, 
only eight answers were received. Furthermore, not all replied to all questions, based on their 
lack of expertise in particular areas, meaning the number of replies was in some cases as low 
as 7.  This led to the fact that the dropout rate exceeded the value of the termination criterion 
three: ‘Dropout rate is 40% or higher’. This is further discussed in the summary of Round 2. 
 
Questions Remarks 
Q1: Rank the following factors advancing laser 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = Most 
significant, 2 = least significant.  If you feel the list is 
missing factor/s, please add them in “Remarks” 
column. 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
 
You are encouraged to justify your ranking in the “Remarks” column, especially 
regarding the most/least significant factors. 
Q2: Rank the following factors hindering laser 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = Most 
significant, 16 = least significant.  If you feel the list 
is missing factor/s, please add them in “Remarks” 
column. 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
 
You are encouraged to justify your ranking in the “Remarks” column, especially 
regarding the most/least significant factors. 
Q3: Year when laser weapons will be commonly 
used by the military? 
 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 1 and keep in mind the lists of 
factors you just ranked. NOTE: Consider the relation between questions 3&4 
together keeping in mind the descriptions under the questions.    
- Commonly= at least one Service of any nation’s armed forces has 
more than 10 operational lasers in the field. 
Q4: Year when land based laser weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence? 
 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 1 and keep in mind the lists of 
factors you just ranked.  NOTE: Consider the relation between questions 3&4 
together keeping in mind the descriptions under the questions.   
- Consider the ability of destroying fast moving manned aircraft size 
targets. NOT low power non-lethal engagements (e.g. sensor 
dazzlement). 
Q5:  Rank the following factors advancing HPRF 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = Most 
significant, 4 = least significant 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal.   
You are encouraged to justify your ranking in the “Remarks” column, especially 
regarding the most/least significant factors. 
Q6:  Rank the following factors hindering HPRF 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = Most 
significant, 11 = least significant 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal.   
You are encouraged to justify your ranking in the “Remarks” column, especially 
regarding the most/least significant factors. 
Q7: Year when HPRF weapons are commonly 
used by the military? 
 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 1 and keep in mind the lists of 
factors you just ranked.   
- Commonly= at least one Service of any nation’s armed forces has 
more than 10 operational HPRF weapons in the field. 
Q8: Year when land based HPRF weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence?  
 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 1 and keep in mind the lists of 
factors you just ranked.  
- Consider a situation where an airborne platform is forced to abort its 
mission after being engaged by HPRF weapon.   
Q9: Rank the following non-technical factors that 
influence/could have an impact on the proliferation 
of DEW in order of significance. 1 = Most significant, 
15 = least significant 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal.   
You are encouraged to justify your ranking in the “Remarks” column, especially 
regarding the most/least significant factors. 
 
Table 14: Round 2 Questions. 
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Answers to Q1 
 
In Q1 of Round 2, the panellists were given two factors, based on Q2 of Round 1, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q1: ‘Rank the following factors advancing laser weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 15: Round 2 Q1 Answers. 
 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.5625 
X²= 4.5 
p-value= 0.034. 
 
Answers to Q2 
 
In Q2 of Round 2, the panellists were given 16 factors, based on Q2 of Round 1, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q2: ‘Rank the following factors hindering laser weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 16: Round 2 Q2 Answers. 
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The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.2412 
X²= 25.32 
p-value= 0.046. 
 
Based on the answers a table, depicted below in Table 17, consisting the ranked attributes was 
composed. 
 
Table 17: Ranking based on Round 2 Q2 Answers. 
 
Answers to Q3 
 
The answers for Q3: ‘Year when laser weapons will be commonly used by the military?’ are 
depicted in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 21: Round 2 Q3 Answers. 
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Answers to Q4 
 
The answers for Q4: ‘Year when land based laser weapons are mature enough to be used for 
air defence?’ are depicted in the diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 22: Round 2 Q4 Answers. 
 
Answers to Q5 
 
In Q5 of Round 2, the panellists were given four factors, based on Q5 of Round 1, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q5: ‘Rank the following factors advancing HPRF weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 18: Round 2 Q5 Answers. 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.086 
X²= 1.8 
p-value= 0.615. 
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Based on the answers a table, depicted below in Table 19, consisting the ranked attributes was 
composed. 
 
Table 19: Ranking based on Round 2 Q5 Answers. 
 
Answers to Q6 
 
In Q6 of Round 2, the panellists were given 11 factors, based on Q5 of Round 1, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q6: ‘Rank the following factors hindering HPRF weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 20: Round 2 Q6 Answers. 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.14 
X²= 9.77 
p-value= 0.46. 
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Based on the answers a table, depicted below in Table 21, consisting the ranked attributes was 
composed. 
 
Table 21: Ranking based on Round 2 Q6 Answers. 
Answers to Q7 
 
The answers for Q7: ‘Year when HPRF weapons are commonly used by the military?’ are 
depicted in the diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 23: Round 2 Q7 Answers. 
Answers to Q8 
 
The answers for Q8: ‘Year when land based HPRF weapons are mature enough to be used for 
air defence?’ are depicted in the diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 24: Round 2 Q8 Answers. 
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Answers to Q9 
 
In Q9 of Round 2, the panellists were given 15 factors, based on Q7 of Round 1, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q9: ‘Rank the following non-technical factors that influence/could have an 
impact on the proliferation of DEW in order of significance’ are depicted in the table below. 
Based on the statistical method applied the answers of one panellist were excluded as he had 
not ranked all factors. The inclusion of his rankings could have distorted the answers and thus 
the validity of the research. 
 
 
Table 22: Round 2 Q9 Answers. 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.2 
X²= 16.87 
p -value= 0.26 
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Based on the answers a table, depicted below in Table 23, consisting the ranked attributes was 
composed. 
 
Table 23: Ranking based on Round 2 Q9 Answers. 
 
4.3.1. Summary of Round Two 
 
Round two consisted nine questions including both attribute rankings and year estimations. The 
year estimations were the iteration of the same questions asked in Round 1. The rankings of 
factors were performed for the first time although based on the lists produced by the panellists 
in Round 1. Round two gave us the first opportunity to assess and analyse the answers and their 
validity and also to assess the overall situation regarding the stopping criteria presented in 
Chapter 4.1. It is significant to keep the stopping criteria in mind before composing the 
questionnaire for the next round because, for example, there may be some questions which do 
not require further iteration for one reason or another. Thus an initial analysis of the results was 
performed, and its results are discussed next. 
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Based on the stopping criteria set in chapter 4.1 the following observations were made: 
1. Kendall’s W reaches 0.7 (Ranking questions). No ranking question’s W- value reached 
anywhere close to 0.7. The best value was 0.5625 which represents moderate agreement, 
but all other values were extremely poor, some less than 0.1, so this stopping criterion was 
not met. However, the results of question 1 were seen to require further analysis of their 
validity. This was because despite the fact that panellists had almost unanimously ranked 
the attributes, in the same way, W- value was still quite modest. Based on this observation 
a sensitivity analysis was performed and by deleting one panellist’s rankings (9GC) gave 
us a W-value of 1 meaning full agreement. Based on this it was decided that question 1: 
‘Rank the following factors advancing laser weapon maturity in order of significance’ 
would not be included in the upcoming round as the panel had reached strong agreement 
although not indicated by the W- value. 
2. Results of two successive rounds show no significant change. This criterion was not present 
in any of the questions. All the classic Delphi results showed change towards a more unified 
result. In addition, the ranking questions had no previous round to compare with. The 
changes in the results of the classic Delphi questions are shown in the following diagrams, 
and they all represent a clear shift towards a more consolidated result. As the iteration 
process was not finished these results were not scrutinised any further at this phase.  
Figure 25: Evolvement of Replies between Rounds 1 and 2 to Question: Year when 
laser weapons will be commonly used by the military? 
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Figure 26: Evolvement of Replies between Rounds 1 and 2 to Question: Year when 
land based laser weapons are mature enough to be used for air defence? 
 
Figure 27: Evolvement of Replies between Rounds 1 and 2 to Question: Year when 
HPRF weapons will be used by the military? 
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Figure 28: Evolvement of Replies between Rounds 1 and 2 to Question: Year when 
land based HPRF weapons are mature enough to be used for air defence?’  
 
3. Dropout rate exceeds 40%. Whether or not this stopping criterion was met depends on 
the approach. When the stopping criteria were set, it was not decided what the 
comparison number is, and thus there are two ways of looking at the criterion. The first 
view on the issue is to regard the number of people who agreed to answer (13) as the 
comparison value. This would mean that since the number of respondents in round two 
was between six and eight the dropout rate would range from 38.5% (n=8) to 53.9% 
(n=6). This approach means that all questions with n<8 meet this stopping criterion.  As 
a result questions 2, 5, 6 and 9 would not be eligible for further iteration.  
 
Another approach is to consider the number of actual respondents in round one (10) as 
the comparison value. Should this be the case, we would get dropout rates ranging from 
20% (n=8) to 40% (n=6). If this approach is applied none of the questions, although 
question 9 sits on the threshold, would meet the stopping criterion. It was decided to 
adopt the latter approach as it enabled us to proceed the iteration. By choosing the other 
approach, we would have had to stop the iteration process and start over the panellist 
identification. As this research has a strict deadline, this was not possible. Furthermore, 
it was established that this was more to do with the equivocal stopping criterion than the 
validity of the research. This controversy in interpreting a stopping criterion underlines 
the significance of composing unambiguous stopping criteria. 
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4. We reach round three. This does not need any explanation as this was not the case at 
this time. 
4.4.  Round Three of the Delphi Panel 
Based on the round two answers round three questionnaire consisted the same four timeline 
assessment questions and three attribute lists to be ranked. Based on round 2 results one ranking 
question was decided to be excluded from further iteration, the reasons behind this are discussed 
above in chapter 4.3.1. The panellists were made aware of the results of previous round by 
providing them with diagrams depicting the answer distribution and the ranks and mean ranks. 
Again, as was done in round 2, an emphasis was made to highlight the definitions for the 
panellist to minimise interpretation issues. The questionnaire also included a free text column, 
and the respondents were encouraged to justify their calls and comment the topics in general. 
The questions of Round 3 are illustrated in Table 24. 
Questions Remarks 
Q1: Rank the following factors hindering laser 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = 
Most significant, 16 = least significant.  If you 
feel the list is missing factor/s, please add them 
in “Remarks” column. 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
 
Q2: Year when laser weapons will be 
commonly used by the military? 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2 and keep in mind the 
lists of factors you just ranked. NOTE: Consider the relation between 
questions 2&3 together keeping in mind the descriptions under the 
questions.   
- Commonly= at least one Service of any nation’s armed forces has 
more than 10 operational lasers in the field. 
Q3: Year when land based laser weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence? 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 1 and keep in mind the 
lists of factors you just ranked.  NOTE: Consider the relation between 
questions 2&3together keeping in mind the descriptions under the questions.   
- Consider the ability of destroying fast moving manned aircraft 
size targets. NOT low power non-lethal engagements (e.g. 
sensor dazzlement). 
Q4:  Rank the following factors advancing 
HPRF weapon maturity in order of significance. 
1 = Most significant, 4 = least significant 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
 
Q5:  Rank the following factors hindering HPRF 
weapon maturity in order of significance. 1 = 
Most significant, 11 = least significant 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
Q6: Year when HPRF weapons are commonly 
used by the military? 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2 and keep in mind the 
lists of factors you just ranked.  
- Commonly= at least one Service of any nation’s armed forces 
has more than 10 operational HPRF weapons in the field. 
Q7: Year when land based HPRF weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence? 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2 and keep in mind the 
lists of factors you just ranked.  
Consider a situation where an airborne platform is forced to abort its 
mission after a being engaged by HPRF weapon. 
Q8: Rank the following non-technical factors 
that influence/could have an impact on the 
proliferation of DEW in order of significance. 1 = 
Most significant, 15 = least significant 
Before answering take a look at the results of Round 2. 
Give EACH attribute a ranking. No two attribute can be ranked equal. 
 
Table 24: Round 3 Questions. 
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The questionnaire was sent to all eight panellists who replied to round two. They were given 
two weeks to reply after which a reminder was sent to those who had not responded. A total of 
three reminders were sent and the total answering time was approximately ten weeks. 
Nonetheless, there were no dropouts in round three, and all panellists replied. However, not all 
replied to all questions, based on their lack of expertise in particular areas, meaning the number 
of replies was in some cases as low as 7.  
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Answers to Q1 
 
In Q1 of Round 3, the panellists were given 15 factors, based on Q2 of Round 2, to be ranked. 
The answers for Q1: ‘Rank the following factors hindering laser weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 25: Round 3 Q1 Answers. 
 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.167 
X²= 17.596 
p-value= 0.284. 
A sensitivity analysis was performed, and it was learned that by excluding respondent GO1’s 
answers W will be 0.35 which is still regarded as poor agreement. However, by disregarding 
GO1’s answers, the p-value was 0.0079 which is below the validity threshold of 0.05.  
Exclusion of other respondents did not have a significant effect on the W or p, and neither did 
the exclusion of any single factor.  
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Answers to Q2 
 
The answers for Q2: ‘Year when laser weapons will be commonly used by the military?’ are 
depicted in the diagram below.  
 
 
Figure 29: Round 3 Q2 Answers. 
Answers to Q3 
 
The answers for Q4: ‘Year when land based laser weapons are mature enough to be used for 
air defence?’ are depicted in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 30: Round 3 Q3 Answers. 
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Answers to Q4 
 
In Q4 of Round 3, the panellists were given four factors to be ranked. The answers for Q4: 
‘Rank the following factors advancing HPRF weapon maturity in order of significance’ are 
depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 26: Round 3 Q4 Answers. 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.18 
X²= 3.85 
p-value= 0.27 
 
Answers to Q5 
 
In Q5 of Round 3, the panellists were given the same 11 factors as in Round 2 to be ranked. 
The answers for Q6: ‘Rank the following factors hindering HPRF weapon maturity in order of 
significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 27: Round 3 Q5 Answers. 
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The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.52 
X²= 36.7 
p-value= <0.001 
 
A sensitivity analysis was performed, and it was learned that by excluding respondent F9C’s 
answers W would be 0.72 which is regarded as strong agreement. Exclusion of other 
respondents did not have a significant effect on the W- value.  
 
Answers to Q6 
 
The answers for Q7: ‘Year when HPRF weapons are commonly used by the military?’ are 
depicted in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 31: Round 3 Q6 Answers. 
Answers to Q7 
 
The answers for Q7: ‘Year when land based HPRF weapons are mature enough to be used for air 
defence?’ are depicted in the diagram below.  
 
Figure 32: Round 3 Q7 Answers. 
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Answers to Q8 
 
In Q8 of Round 3, the panellists were given 15 factors to be ranked. The answers for Q9: ‘Rank 
the following non-technical factors that influence/could have an impact on the proliferation of 
DEW in order of significance’ are depicted in the table below.  
 
 
Table 28: Round 2 Q8 Answers. 
The following values were computed to assist in statistical analysis: 
W = 0.36 
X²= 35.5 
p-value= 0.0012. 
 
4.4.1. Summary of Round Three 
 
Round three consisted eight questions including both attribute rankings and year estimations. 
The year estimations were iterated for the third time as they were incorporated in both previous 
rounds too. On the other hand, this was the second iteration of the attribute rankings as they 
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were not included in Round 1. Round three provided sound data for an overall analysis which 
will be performed in the results chapter. By performing the third Delphi round, we met the 
fourth stopping criterion, ‘When we reach Round three’ as established in chapter 4.1. Based on 
meeting the stopping criterion Round three is the final Delphi round of this research 
4.5. Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Assessment of Current DEW Systems 
In this chapter, the Technology Readiness Levels of DEW systems are assessed. The assessment 
of individual system is performed by inserting publicly available data into USAF TRL 
calculator. We begin by introducing the calculators operating principles.  
The calculator is based on MS Excel, and it consists of a summary sheet and data sheet. In the 
summary sheet, the user can choose which elements are included in the assessment. For this 
research, only technological readiness was chosen, and both manufacturing and programmatic 
levels were omitted. The set points for green/yellow were set to 85%/green and 67% for yellow. 
These colours indicate when the set percentage of a given TRL level is reached. The baseline 
values for this research are illustrated, as seen in the calculator, in Figure 33. 
Figure 33: Baseline values for USAF TRL Calculator. 
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Figure 34: Summary View of USAF TRL Calculator. 
Figure 34 depicts an example of the summary view. In this specific case, the calculator indicates 
green for TRL6 and yellow for TRL7. This means the system has fulfilled at least 85% of 
requirements for TRL6 and at least 67% of the requirements for TRL7. Consequently, we can 
state that the system is solid TRL6 and nearing TRL7. 
Figure 35: Example of Data View of USAF TRL Calculator. 
In Figure 35 we can see an example of TRL6 questions and how they are shown in the data 
sheet. A given requirement is checked when it has been met. If a requirement is partially 
fulfilled, it is possible to indicate this in percentages. This allows a more detailed monitoring 
of the programme maturity development. In this research, as we relied solely on publicly 
available information, requirements were deemed either completed or not, and no percentages 
were used. 
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Table 29 includes the assessed TRL together with the justification for the given TRL. The 
systems/programmes are based on the findings of the literature review including most of the 
programmes introduced in Table 4 and Table 5. However, few of the programmes of literature 
review were excluded as adequate information was not available to assess their technological 
maturity. 
Programme Name TRL  TRL Justification Remarks 
HPM Demonstrator [29]0 7 TRL 7 fully met. Some TRL 8 steps also taken.  
ABL (Airborne Laser) 6/7 TRL 7 met apart from “components are representatives of 
production components”. Some TRL 8 steps also taken. 
Program 
cancelled 
ATL (Advanced Tactical Laser) 6/7 TRL 7 met apart from “components are representatives of 
production components”. Some TRL 8 steps also taken. 
Program 
cancelled 
CHAMP (Counter-electronics High-
powered Advanced Missile 
Project)[20][60] 
6/7 Solid TRL 6. Most of TRL 7 requirements met.  
HELE/LWM (High Energy Laser 
Effector/Laser Weapon Module) [54] 
6/7 Solid TRL 6. Most of TRL 7 requirements met.  
LAWS (LAser Weapon System) [47] 6/7 TRL 6 fully met. TRL 7 met apart from “components are 
representatives of production components”. 
 
GBAD DE OTM (Ground Based Air 
Defence Directed Energy On The Move) 
[48] 
6 Solid TRL 6. Many of TRL 7 requirements met.  
HELLADS (High Energy Liquid Laser Air 
Defense System) [61] [31] 
5/6 TRL 5 fully met. TRL 6 mostly met and also some 
requirements of TRL 7. 
 
MLD (Maritime Laser Demonstrator) [47] 5 TRL 5 fully met. Only a few of TRL 6 requirements are met.  
RELI (Robust Electric Laser Initiative) 
[69][69] 
4/5 Solid TRL 4. Most of TRL 5 requirements met.  
DPAL (Diode Pumped Alkali Laser) 4/5 Solid TRL 4. Most of TRL 5 requirements met.  
Gamma [46] 3/4 TRL 3 fully met. Most of TRL 4 requirements met.  
LDEW (Laser Directed Energy Weapon) 
[72] 
3 Solid TRL 3.  
FEL (Free Electron Laser)[2][33]0 2/3 TRL 2 fully met. Most of TRL 3 requirements met.  
Table 29: TRL Assessment of DEW Programmes. 
  
4.5.1. Summary of TRL Assessment 
A USAF TRL calculator was used to discover the current TRL’s of DEW systems. The values 
inserted to the calculator were based on public information, and thus not all the information 
was available. It was established that the readiness levels range from TRL2 up to TRL7. Out of 
the 14 systems assessed 50% were between TRL6 and TRL7.  The results together with their 
implications are covered in the results chapter. 
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5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
“We tend to overestimate the effect of a technology in the 
short run and underestimate the effect in the long run.” 
 
Roy Namara (1925-2007) 
 
 
In this chapter, the results of the literature review together with the results of the Delphi survey 
and TRL assessment are introduced in respective sub-chapters. This is followed by a discussion 
where the results are combined, and their meaning is analysed.  In addition, individual answers 
to research questions are provided. 
5.1. Findings of the Literature Review 
The literature review was conducted to find answers to sub-question 1 ‘What are the 
technologies and systems under development for AA and CRAM?’ and to aid in composing the 
questions for the Delphi survey. As a consequence, there was a need to investigate the basic 
operating and scientific principles of directed energy weapons and to obtain information on the 
current status of relevant DEW programmes accompanied with insight on the DEW 
technologies’ advantages and shortfalls. It was concluded that: 
- For this study, the definition for DEW is adopted from US DoD Joint Publication 1-02 
as: ‘A weapon or system that uses directed energy to incapacitate, damage, or destroy 
enemy equipment facilities, and/or personnel.' 
- DEWs cannot be categorised solely under non-kinetic weapons as there are also kinetic 
DEWs 
- The most prominent and mature DEW technologies today are High Energy Lasers 
(HEL) and High Power Radio Frequency Weapons (HPRF) 
- Numerous ongoing programmes are developing HEL systems accompanied with a 
smaller number of HPRF programmes 
- Both HEL and HPRF have a solid scientific foundation, and their utility as weapons 
have been researched for decades 
- There are some functioning DEW demonstrators 
- Despite the lengthy research and testing many obstacles remain to mature the 
technologies to the level where they could be deployed 
- Output powers of current DEW are far from being adequate in engaging manned aircraft 
size targets  
- In general high energy lasers (HEL) are categorised into four classes. These are Solid 
State Laser (SSL), Dye/Liquid Laser, Gas Laser and Free Electron Laser (FEL) 
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- There are four categories of HPRF weapon effects: upset, lockup, latch-up and burnout  
- Advantages of DEW include: Collateral damage reduction, Infinite magazine, low 
engagement price, beam travels at a speed of light, ability to engage multiple targets 
simultaneously and silence 
- Disadvantages of DEW include: Size, weight and power (SWaP) issues,  cooling related 
to excess heat, precision tracking requirements due to narrow beam, collateral damage 
and fratricide issues, need for a line of sight, limitations in range and weather related 
power losses 
- Although there are some surveys made no unclassified DEW maturity studies have been 
published thus far 
 
It was discovered that the DEWs are of interest especially to the US military and all US Services 
have their ongoing DEW programmes. This results in a rather complex array of both separate 
and interlinked programmes. US Air Force was the first Service pursuing to develop a DE 
system, and their chemical laser systems reached rather high technology readiness levels 
already in the early 1990’s. These were followed by airborne applications in the 2000’s.  
However, these programmes were then cancelled due to issues/restrictions related to chemical 
laser technology. Currently, naval applications are the most prominent and mature, especially 
when lasers are in question. This is mostly due to certain SWaP- related advantages in 
integration to ships compared to land or air platforms.  
5.2. Results of the Delphi Method 
In this chapter, the results of the Delphi method are introduced and discussed. The Delphi 
consisted both classic forecasting and ranking type questions, and their results are covered in 
separate sub chapters.  
5.2.1. Results of Classic Forecast Delphi Questions  
In total there were four classic Delphi questions which were used to provide an estimated 
timeframe when a certain technology would be in use. There were two questions for laser and 
two for HPRF weapons. The first question sought an estimated timeframe for the use of the 
particular technology in general while the second question regarded the use of the same 
technology in countering manned size aircraft. As stated in chapter 2.2, the median is 
considered to represent the group response in classic type Delphi, and thus it is implemented in 
the following.   
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The results of each round to question “Year when laser weapons will be commonly used by the 
military?” are depicted in Figure 36. The results indicate the development of answers towards 
later years as the iteration progresses. Furthermore, the results also converge as the theory 
behind Delphi suggests. The median in round one is the year 2025 while it shifted to 2030 in 
the final round. The results of the final round do not portray full consensus as the panellist 
answers range across the scale. However, as discussed in chapter 2.2, unanimous Delphi results 
rarely surface. It follows that the results allow us to conclude, based on the median that the 
panellists consider the laser weapons to be commonly used by the military in the year 2030.   
Figure 36: The Development of Answers to: “Year when laser weapons will be 
commonly used by the military?” 
The results of each round to question “Year when land based laser weapons are mature enough 
to be used for air defence?” are depicted in Figure 37. The development of the answers to this 
question is again following the principles of the Delphi method. A clear change to a more shared 
view can be seen as all answering options are used in round one while only three options are 
used in the third round. It is also noteworthy that the median answer shifts towards a later date 
as the iteration advances. Based on the answers given by the panellists we can conclude that 
they estimate land based laser weapons to be mature enough for air defence in the year 2030-
2035.  
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Figure 37: The Development of Answers to: “Year when land based laser weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence?” 
The other two classic Delphi questions were HPRF- related. The results of each round to 
question “Year when HPRF weapons are commonly used by the military?” are depicted in 
Figure 38. Again the development of the answers portrays the principles of the Delphi method 
as the answers clearly converge from the outset. In fact, the third round shows significant 
consensus amongst the panellists as over 70% have chosen the same answer. Also in this 
question, the median answer shifts towards a later date as the iteration advances. As a 
conclusion, the panellists state HPRF weapons will be commonly used by the military in the 
year 2025-2030.  
Figure 38: The Development of Answers to: “Year when HPRF weapons are commonly 
used by the military?” 
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The results of each round to question “Year when land based HPRF weapons are mature 
enough to be used for air defence?” are depicted in Figure 39. Again we can see the 
development of the answers indicating convergence from the outset. However, unlike the other 
three results, in this question, the final round indicates two alternate versions of the forecasted 
future. This is a phenomenon sometimes accompanied with forecast Delphi. It follows that we 
have two somewhat opposing views that need to be considered when the overall results are 
discussed. Nonetheless, again based on the median, the panellists view that HPRF weapons are 
mature enough to be used for air defence in the year 2025-2030. 
Figure 39: The Development of Answers to: “Year when land based HPRF weapons 
are mature enough to be used for air defence?” 
5.2.2. Results of Ranking Delphi Questions  
The Delphi rounds included a total of five ranking type questions. In Round 1 the panellists 
were given specific topics and asked to name topic related factors.  These factors were clustered 
by the researcher and then sent to be ranked and iterated in the following rounds. An exception 
was made regarding one question. The question ‘Rank the following factors advancing laser 
weapon maturity in order of significance’ was not send to iteration after second round as the 
results showed strong conformance after Round 1. The results of the ranking type questions are 
introduced and discussed next. 
 
The first ranking question was ‘Rank the following factors advancing laser weapon maturity in 
order of significance’ consisting of only two factors. Its final results are depicted in Table 30. 
The first round gave a W-value of 0.5625 (p= 0.034) but after sensitivity analysis, disregarding 
answers of 9GC, the W-value peaked to 1.00 (p=0.008) meaning full conformance. This meant 
that we had reached a stopping criterion and the particular question was not send for further 
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iteration. Hence we conclude that the panellists were in strong agreement that increase in 
computing power is the main enabler to mature laser weapons. 
 
Table 30: Final Answers to: ‘Rank the following factors advancing laser weapon 
maturity in order of significance’. 
The next ranking question was: ‘Rank the following factors hindering laser weapon maturity in 
order of significance’. This question included 16 factors to be ranked in Round 2, and it was 
iterated in Round 3. The first ranking gave a W-value of 0.2412 (p=0.046), and after iteration, 
the W was 0.167, (p=0.28) both indicating poor agreement. Sensitivity analysis revealed that 
there was an only small change for the better if any single respondent was excluded. Therefore 
it was concluded that the panel did not reach consensus regarding the importance of the factors. 
However, the list is based on the factors provided by the panellists in Round 1, so the factors 
themselves are valid. The results are shown in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: Final Answers to: ‘Rank the following factors hindering laser weapon maturity 
in order of significance’. 
 
  81 
Since the required level of agreement was not reached, there was a need to examine the factors’ 
relative importance by other means. Hence tiers based on significant gaps between the mean 
ranks were generated. It was decided that 0.5 would be considered as a significant gap between 
consecutive mean ranks. These gaps are marked in the matrix with a red line. The line also 
separates the tiers. Each tier encompasses factors that are considered equally important. 
Because of the decided gap of 0.5 some tiers include only single a factor. The tiers are in order 
of significance from the top down. For example, we can state that the panel considers 
‘cooling/waste heat’ (Tier 2) to be a more significant factor than ‘mobility’ (Tier 3). However, 
due to poor W- value, we cannot determine the order of the factors within a particular tier. 
In total six tiers were identified, and they formed the basis for further analysis. Firstly, it is 
evident that the panel considers the cost to be the least hindering factor for laser weapon 
maturity. This is also quite natural as the price of the system is relative to what kind of capability 
it can provide together with the life cycle costs related to it. Thus when laser weapons are up to 
their promises, a price most likely will not be a factor.  
A second notion regards the factor concerning the handling of chemical lasers. The replies are 
quite evenly divided into both end of the spectrum, the factor was either considered very 
important or totally irrelevant. This is likely due to the reason that all respondents are aware of 
the problems related to toxic chemicals, but some consider it no longer a factor as their use has 
virtually ended. Nonetheless, as toxic chemicals are not used in systems under development, 
this factor does not require further consideration. 
A peculiar notion is that although power consumption and wall-plug efficiency are basically 
the same thing they are quite far on the table. Their marriage results from the fact that if a 
system has a good wall-plug efficiency, it consumes less power. Most likely respondents 
unfamiliar with the term ‘wall-plug efficiency’ ranked it to be the least significant. In retrospect, 
these factors probably should have been aggregated before Round 2. Nonetheless, power 
consumption was seen significant and it is in the 2nd tier, so the location of wall-plug efficiency 
in tier 4 is not changing the big picture. 
As a whole, the greatest issues were seen to relate to optics, beam quality and precision tracking. 
These all are affecting laser weapons ability to function as an effector. Therefore it can be said 
that the panel also identified the most vital factors for the laser to serve as a weapon.  
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Third ranking question inquired panellists’ perception about issues relating to advancing HPRF 
weapons’ maturity and was: ‘Rank the following factors advancing HPRF weapon maturity in 
order of significance’. This question consisted of 4 factors that were ranked in Round 2 and 
then further iterated in Round 3. The first ranking gave a W-value of 0.086 (p=0.61), and after 
iteration, the W was 0.183 (p=0.28) both indicating very poor agreement. Sensitivity analysis 
revealed that there was an only small change for the better if any single respondent was 
excluded. Therefore it is evident that the panel did not reach consensus regarding the 
importance of the factors. However, the list is based on the factors provided by the panellists in 
Round 1, so the factors themselves are valid. The results are shown in Table 32. 
 
Table 32: Final Answers to: ‘Rank the following factors advancing HPRF weapon 
maturity in order of significance’. 
Due to the poor W –value the results could be analysed utilising the same approach as before, 
by identifying significant gaps in the mean ranks. However, in this case, the approach was 
unfertile as there were no gaps which exceed the agreed 0.5 level. It follows that we can only 
state that the panellists concur their earlier view regarding the price factor. A high price was 
not regarded as a remarkable factor in hindering the advancement laser, and on the other hand, 
the possible low price of the HPRF weapons is not seen advancing HPRF maturity. In other 
words, it stresses the earlier notion of price-capability ratio.  
The next ranking question covered the hindering factors to HPRF weapon maturity. It contained 
11 factors and asked: ‘Rank the following factors hindering HPRF weapon maturity in order of 
significance’. After Round 2 the W –value was 0.14 (p = 0.46) but it was significantly enhanced 
in Round 3 as it rose to 0.52 (p < .001) indicating modest agreement. By performing sensitivity 
analysis, it was learned that the exclusion of respondent F9C would indicate strong agreement 
with W=0.72 (p < .001). However, the sensitivity analysis also revealed that the exclusion of 
F9C would only change the order of the first four factors while the rest would remain the same. 
Thus it was decided to include all respondents but incorporate two different rank columns into 
the result table. The results are shown in Table 33. 
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Table 33: Final Answers to: ‘Rank the following factors hindering HPRF weapon 
maturity in order of significance’. 
 
The ‘Moderate agreement rank’ refers to final ranking after Round 3 (W=0.52, p < .001)) 
showing individual ranking for all 11 factors. The ‘Strong agreement rank’ has the first four 
factors clustered under one rank meaning they are equally important. By aggregating the four 
first factors, we get W=0.72 (p < .001) indicating strong agreement. This allows the reader to 
compare the two alternatives and utilise the one that suits him/her the best. As per this research, 
the ‘strong agreement rank’ column is perceived to be more useful, and the following discussion 
is based on it. 
Results wise the panel is in strong agreement of the presented factors and their ranking. By 
scrutinising the table, we can observe some factors of particular interest. The most noticeable 
results include ‘power’ and ‘size’ locating at the very bottom and with a clear margin. A 
conclusion can be drawn that power and size will not be major issues in HPFR maturing. 
As for the group of four factors ranked as the most important, there do not seem to be a common 
nominator. The group includes wavelength, computing capability, EM compatibility as well as 
possible buyer hesitation. However, it is noteworthy that buyer hesitation is regarded a major 
factor, another common feature with laser weapons. 
The final ranking was about non-technical factors covering DEWs in general. The question, 
‘Rank the following non-technical factors that influence/could have an impact on the 
proliferation of DEW in order of significance’, included 15 factors. After Round 2 the W –value 
was 0.2 (p = 0.26) and it got up to 0.32 (p = 0.0012) after Round 3. Although the panel’s opinion 
showed convergence, it did not reach even moderate level. Therefore there was a need to 
aggregate some factors into groups, and again the 0.5 was the value used for a significant gap. 
This resulted in seven tiers as illustrated in Table 34. 
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Table 34: Final Answers to: ‘Rank the following non-technical factors that 
influence/could have an impact on the proliferation of DEW in order of significance’. 
 
The table shows clearly that the respondents’ main worry is how DEW’s and laser, in particular, 
will be perceived from the legislative perspective. Apparently, there are doubts or fears that the 
use of laser might be banned or restricted by international law. Three top tiers are more or less 
related to worries regarding legislation, policies, or public and user scepticism. 
Another main non-technical issue with a rather high tier is concerning weather. Although it is 
only found in the 3rd tier, it is the first factor that is not human made. In another word, weather 
related issues are perceived as the main scientific factor that could prevent the widespread 
deployment of DEWs.  On a further note, it is one of the rankings where the panel opinion is 
very controversial. Whereas two respondents view ‘weather’ to be very little of a factor by 
giving it ranks 14 and 15, other two ranks it as the most important factor. This is one of the 
reasons, but by no means the only one, behind the poor W –value for this ranking.  
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5.2.3. Summary of Delphi Results  
The Delphi was used to establish scientifically valid information of the assessed maturity of 
DEW in the future together with estimated factors that could either advance or hinder the 
maturing. The main findings revealed by the Delphi were: 
- Laser weapon will be commonly used by the military in 2030 
- Laser weapons will be mature enough for air defence in 2030-2035 
- HPRF weapons will be commonly used by the military in 2025-2030 
- HPRF weapons will be mature enough to be used for air defence in 2025-2030 
- Computing power is the main enabler for maturing laser weapons 
- Price of the laser systems will not be a factor once the systems can provide the expected 
capability 
- Power consumption of laser systems must be reduced to a reasonable level before 
widespread use 
- Key issues preventing laser weapon maturity are related to optics, beam quality and 
precision tracking 
- Price of the HPRF systems will not be a factor once the systems can provide the 
expected capability 
- Regarding the DEW, in general, the main issues were related to legislation, policies and 
public/user scepticism 
- The weather was the main scientific factor that could prevent the widespread use of 
DEWs. 
The classic Delphi questions served their purpose well, and the respondent’s results were 
converging towards a common view. Based on the median of answers a panel opinion was 
formed which enabled us to answer SQ2. The ranking Delphi, however, was not able to yield 
consensus based rankings. Nonetheless, the analysis of the ranked lists allowed us to identify 
important factors for further discussion.  As a whole, the Delphi rounds provided an excellent 
collection of results that can be contrasted with the results of other methods and discussed in 
chapter 5.4. 
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5.3. Results of TRL Assessment 
Based on the table presented in chapter 4.5 we can conclude that the DEW programmes’ TRLs 
range from 2 to 7. According to the material discussed in chapter 2.6, it takes between 6-9 years 
for a complex system to advance from TRL6 to TRL9 and between 6-16 years from TRL4 to 
TRL9 [43][44][9]. This does not, however, mean that maturing always occurs. On the contrary, 
many programmes are cancelled, due to various reasons, although having reached TRL6 or 
even above.  This is also the case with some of the programmes presented in the table. It follows 
that we need to keep in mind that although TRL assessment can aid in drawing conclusions of 
the expected timeline, it does not tell anything about the likelihood of reaching the next TRL. 
Figure 40 presents the assessed technology readiness levels together with the target size the 
systems are currently able to engage. The fourfold table indicates that there is only one system 
capable of reaching powers high enough (+500kW, the power requirements were discussed in 
chapter 3.2.3) to down a manned aircraft size target. That is the ABL, a programme that has 
been cancelled and most likely will not be continued. Furthermore, the only other system able 
to reach powers exceeding 100kW, the ATL, has also been cancelled. Both of these systems 
were gas lasers utilising highly toxic chemical fuel, and that laser technology has been declared 
more or less a dead end. 
Figure 40: DEW Programmes’ TRLs and Current Target Sizes. 
  87 
On the other hand, there is a rather large number of systems/programmes under development. 
About half of these are above TRL 5 and some as high as TRL7. The time it will take in 
maturing these into TRL 9 depends on many variables, but probably the most significant are 
the aspired power level/size of the target.   The programmes aiming for developing systems to 
counter small UAV have, in general, reached quite high TRL compared to programmes aspiring 
to attain the megawatt level. This phenomenon can be seen in Figure 41. 
 
Figure 41: DEW Programmes’ TRLs and Aspired Target Sizes. 
 
In Figure 41, the programmes are placed on the same fourfold table as in Figure 40, but their 
location on the horizontal axis is based on the programme’s power goal. The table also includes 
the estimated TRL of MLD/JHPSSL programme. Although there was not adequate information 
to assess its TRL by using the TRL calculator, the programme was included in the table because 
it has claimed to have the capability to reach the 500kW marker. The table enables us to divide 
the programmes into three main tiers based on their goals regarding power. The 1st tier contains 
systems aiming for powers more than 500kW, 2nd tier holds systems intending to reach 100- 
300kW and the 3rd tier consists of systems aiming for power less than 100kW.  
We can establish that there are three ongoing programmes in the 1st tier and all possess a rather 
modest TRL. FEL is still to attain TRL 3, DPAL is between 4 and 5 while the MLD/JHPLSS 
is estimated in between TRL 4-6. The average TRL of tier one is 4. 
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There are three active programmes in tier two also, but their TRL’s are higher compared to 
those of tier one. RELI’s TRL is assessed to be the lowest but nonetheless, it is close to TRL 5 
and LAWS is almost TRL 7. Tier two’s average TRL is 5.5. 
In the 3rd tier, we have six programmes with TRLs ranging from the LDEW’s 3 to HPM 
demonstrator’s 7. We can also identify that two programmes are significantly immature 
compared to the rest. If these two are not included tier three has an average TRL of 6.5, and if 
they are taken into account, then the mean TRL is 5.5. Tier three also encompasses two HPRF 
systems. It is noteworthy that their target size is not based on the power requirement chart 
presented in chapter 3.2.3 but on the literature review material of the respective systems. The 
material indicates that HPM Demonstrator is capable of downing small UAV [29] and since it 
is based on CHAMP their target sizes are somewhat the same.  
A crucial variable which the tables does not illustrate is the range. Although some literature 
mentioned a range of a system, there still was not enough range information to be incorporated 
into a table. In general, however, a notion that the system’s range is very much dependable on 
its output power was present. Thus cautious predictions can be made of the range of a particular 
system based on the power/target size. Based on Table 3 we can safely state that engagements 
over the distance of 5 km require several hundred kilowatts of power.  
Moreover, as the assessment is based solely on publicly available information, there is a 
reasonable chance that not all the assessed TRL are true. As described in chapter 2.5 TRL 
assessment is a thorough process containing exhaustive amount of detailed information on the 
programme in question. Now only a small portion of this information was available, and there 
is also a possibility that the information is purposefully false or biased. Nonetheless, it was 
assumed that the used information received is adequately accurate and thus an assessment could 
be made to illustrate the general TRL’s of current systems.  
In conclusion, the TRL assessment suggests that maturing the current programmes from 
TRL6/7 into TRL9 will take approximately 6-12 years whereas for the systems with lower TRL 
it will be some14-20 years respectively. Furthermore, it is also concluded that the development 
of systems capable of countering small targets will reach TRL9 sooner than systems aspiring 
to down manned aircraft or cruise missiles. 
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5.4. Discussion of the Results 
In this chapter, the results of all three utilised methods, literature review, Delphi and TRL 
assessment, are collated, contrasted and finally consolidated. The idea is to identify where the 
results of two or more methods support each other as well as where the results are contradictory. 
Furthermore, the findings are critically analysed, and the reasons behind them discussed. 
Although it was decided to use multiple methods mainly to add validity this also provided 
resilience should any of the methods fail. None of them did fail, however, so we can use their 
results as originally planned. 
We gained background information of the scientific foundation of DEW by performing the 
literature review, but it also provided us with sound results regarding the ongoing DEW 
programmes and their goals. It was learned that the scientific foundation of both HEL and HPRF 
weapons is solid and it is backed up with some 60 years of basic research. Also the literature 
review revealed there were at least 14 ongoing laser weapon programmes and five ongoing 
HPRF weapon programmes. The numbers speak for themselves; there is a true ambition to 
develop and field DEWs. To put another way, based on the number of programmes we can 
expect to see further showcasing of demonstrators and prototypes in the future. The DEW is 
becoming more and more prominent player especially as the UAV and swarming threats 
increase. 
The classic part of the Delphi delivered what it was designed to do, year estimates about DEW 
maturity based on expert opinion. However, the ranking type Delphi was not able to fully live 
up to the expectations. It did provide the lists of significant factors regarding DEW maturity 
and proliferation, but the panel never reached consensus in ranking them. We can only speculate 
whether the answers would have displayed more convergence had we included more iteration 
rounds. However, this was not possible due to time restrictions. On the other hand, the 
respondents were so far from shared opinion that reaching consensus is unlikely even with 
further iteration.  
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Having said that, however, the ranking Delphi was by no means a total failure. After arranging 
the factors into groups or tiers, we were able to establish a ranking between the tiers. This 
enabled us to inspect the overarching topic of the tier and thus provided a possibility to pinpoint 
subjects of interest. The most significant ranking Delphi results included the following. 
Computing power is the most important factor in advancing laser maturity. Optics and beam 
quality are regarded as the main obstacles for laser. High price will not be a factor once the 
systems can deliver what expected and weather was considered as number one worry that is not 
humanmade. Moreover, finally, the panel stated their concern about numerous legislative and 
policy related issues. All of these findings provide the basis for discussion to either support or 
question the results of the other methods. 
To provide an all-encompassing view of the main findings a table was composed. In the table, 
shown in Table 35, the main results of literature review, TRL assessment and Delphi are 
presented to provide a comprehensive but concise overview of the results. 
Programme Name Technology TRL Predicted capability in TRL9  Year for TRL9 
based on TRL 
evolvement data 
Year when in 
use based on 
Delphi 
HPM Demonstrator [29]0 HPRF 7 Mobile 
C-UAS 2km 
2021-2027  
HPRF 
 systems 
2025-2030/ 
after 2035 
CHAMP (Counter-electronics 
High-powered Advanced Missile 
Project)[20][60] 
 
HPRF 
 
6/7 
 
Airborne 
latch-up 2km 
 
2023-2029 
HELE/LWM (High Energy Laser 
Effector/Laser Weapon Module) 
[54] 
 
HEL 
 
6/7 
 
N/A 
 
2023-2029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laser  
systems 
2030-2035 
LAWS (LAser Weapon System) 
[47] 
SSL/Fibre 
HEL 
6/7 Shipborne  
C-UAS 5km 
2023-2029 
GBAD DE OTM (Ground Based 
Air Defence Directed Energy On 
The Move) [48] 
 
Laser 
 
6 
 
Mobile  
C-UAS 3km 
 
2023-2029 
HELLADS (High Energy Liquid 
Laser Air Defense System) [61] 
[31] 
Liquid (Dye) 
Laser 
 
5/6 
Airborne C-RAM/C-UAS/ A/G 
10km 
 
2024-2030 
MLD (Maritime Laser 
Demonstrator) [47] 
 
SSL laser 
 
5 
Shipborne 
Anti-aircraft and cruise 
missiles 8km 
 
2024-2030 
RELI (Robust Electric Laser 
Initiative) [69][69] 
SSL/Fibre 
laser 
4/5 C-RAM/C-UAS 8km 2026-2032 
DPAL (Diode Pumped Alkali 
Laser) 
Gas laser 4/5 Up to ballistic missile defence 2026-2032 
Gamma [46] SSL laser 3/4 N/A 2029-2035 
LDEW (Laser Directed Energy 
Weapon) [72] 
Laser 3 Shipborne  
C-UAS 5km 
2029-2035 
FEL (Free Electron 
Laser)[2][33]0 
FEL laser 2/3 Up to ballistic missile defence 2032-2037 
Table 35: Main Findings Combined. 
 
The table consists of columns indicating all the programmes that are both ongoing and whose 
TRL were assessed in chapter 4.5. The literature review provided results for columns 1, 2and 
4, TRL assessment contributed for columns 3, and the Delphi was the enabler for column 6. 
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The information in column 5 was formulated by combining results from the literature review 
and TRL assessment with the TRL evolvement data presented in chapter 2.6. 
 
We can observe from the table that the results regarding years correlate quite well. The HPRF 
systems are regarded to enter TRL9 in 2021-2029 and perceived by the Delphi panel to be 
commonly in use in 2025-2030. However, in this particular case the Delphi results indicated 
two alternative outcomes, and while the median is 2025-2030, there was population stating that 
HPRF weapons would be in use only after 2035. Hence the table shows two results. 
Nonetheless, we can conclude that the timeline is logical and based on assuming TRL9 is 
reached in 2021-2029 it is plausible that HPRF weapons are commonly (10+ operational 
systems as defined in the questionnaire) in use in 2025-2030.  
 
A similar phenomenon can be noticed regarding the laser systems. If the immature systems are 
excluded, the TRL9 year is assessed to be in 2023-2032 while the Delphi results state laser 
weapons are commonly in use in 2030-2035. Again the gap between assessed TRL9 and 
commonly in use is regarded credible. As a conclusion we can say that the results of TRL 
assessment and Delphi concur and complement each other. 
 
In spite the results presented in the table we also have to take into account a variety of variables 
that may either accelerate or impede the maturing process. As for the pervasive use, we also 
have to consider factors like export restrictions and availability. 
 
What comes to the maturing process, we can expect it to correlate to both existing and upcoming 
threats. This is because DEW’s are mainly, at least today, weapons designed to counter a threat 
be it UAV, RAM or some other air vehicle. Although some programmes are aspiring to develop 
an offensive DEW, at least CHAMP and HELLADS, the main driver for the emergence of 
DEW is defence. It follows that if there is a sudden introduction of DEW specific threats we 
are likely to witness rapid growth in funding and thus also earlier maturing. This is how 
militaries operate; once these threats either surface or they are forecasted to surface, militaries 
pursue to counter them, and DEW can provide a possible solution. Mainly these ‘new’ threats 
that can speed up the development are the increased use of UAVs and the introduction of 
salvo/swarming tactics related to UAV and missiles. Especially the escalation of UAV threat is 
expected to boost the development as there already are systems capable of downing small 
UAVs. 
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On the other hand, however, should we not witness the rise of the mentioned threats we may be 
looking at maturing rate indicated in the table or even slower than that. Moreover, we should 
not overlook the fact that reaching TRL6 or 7 does not automatically mean the system is going 
to reach full maturity. This point is proven by numerous programmes including two prominent 
laser programmes covered in this paper too, the ABL and the ATL. Furthermore, even when a 
system is at TRL8 or even 9 it may not deliver what the market needs and thus it will not be 
procured or deployed. An example of this in the DEW domain is the Active Denial System 
which was deployed but never used and later withdrawn from the field.  
 
The case of Active Denial System brings us to the final point regarding factors affecting the 
proliferation of DEW, and that are the human made issues. The Delphi clearly indicated that 
human made factors were perceived to be the main cause for impeding the DEW coming of 
age. These worries covered legislative matters, health and safety issues, rules of engagement 
inflictions, fear for fratricide and general public scepticism. Since the first six factors were 
human made obstacles, this is a notion to be kept in mind as one assesses the entire picture. 
 
Finally, when discussing the year DEWs will be in widespread use, we must not neglect 
availability questions. Currently, USA is the leading innovator in this area of technology. This 
also leads to the fact that she will have the sole right to the technology and thus can decide who 
and when it will sell it to. This changes the question from technological to political, and it is 
out of the scope of this research. Nonetheless, it is a variable that is assumed to have a major 
impact on the widespread use of DEW in the decades to come.  
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5.5. Answers to Research Questions 
In this section, the answers to the research questions are presented together with a rationale 
behind them. 
5.5.1. What are the Technologies and Systems under Development for AA and 
CRAM? 
Based on the literature review this research identified 15 development programmes pursuing 
AA or CRAM capability. Of these 14 are laser systems and one is an HPRF system. These 
systems are presented in Table 36. No other directed energy technologies were involved in 
seeking for AA or CRAM systems.  
 
Programme Name Type Purpose Status Goal 
FEL (Free Electron Laser) Free 
electron 
laser 
Technology maturing 
programme 
Early stage technology 
program MIT & 
Arizona state [2] 
1MW+, 1 meter 
length, 
DPAL (Diode Pumped Alkali 
Laser) 
Gas laser Strategic missile defence, 
ballistic missiles in boost phase 
20-30kW, 20-30kg/kW 1MW+, 2kg/kW [38] 
HELLADS (High Energy Liquid 
Laser Air Defense System) 
[61][31] 
Liquid laser 
(Dye) 
Air Force, A/G, self-protection Developmental, 
entering field trials 
150kW+, weight less 
than 5kg/kW 
GBAD DE OTM (Ground Based 
Air Defence Directed Energy On 
The Move) [48] 
Laser Integration of several systems to 
one complete weapon system. 
Field trials in 2017 UAS engagement 
capability for 
expeditionary forces 
(Marines). 30-50 kW. 
HELE/LWM (High Energy Laser 
Effector/Laser Weapon Module) 
[54] 
Laser Rheinmetall’s self-financed 
technology programme 
Developmental, 
Demonstrator 3x10kW 
Successful 
engagement of UAV 
and RAM 
 
TLS (Tactical Laser System) [7] Laser Ship self-protection. UAS, light 
targets 
10kW demonstrator in 
2011. 
 
LDEW (Laser Directed Energy 
Weapon) [72] 
Laser UK MOD funded programme for 
a capability demonstrator 
Started 1/2017 Demonstrator in 
2019. Possibly 
leading to in service 
weapon in mid-2020. 
Gamma [46] Solid slab 
laser (SSL) 
Northrop Grumman self-financed 
technology programme 
Initial test in 2012 
13,3kW units that can 
be combined 
 
HEL MD (High Energy Laser 
Mobile Demonstrator) [26]. 
Follow-on programme called 
HELMTT 105[53] 
Solid slab 
laser (SSL) 
Proof of principle for mobile 
GBAD DE for Army. HELMTT 
will use RELI’s laser system. 
successful test of 
10kW 
50-100kW. G-RAMM 
capability. 
MLD (Maritime Laser 
Demonstrator) [47] 
 
Solid slab 
laser (SSL) 
Ship self-protection Demonstrator utilizing 
JHPSSL in maritime 
conditions. 105kW in 
2009. 
No stated project 
goal. 300-600kW is 
considered 
achievable. 
JHPSSL (Joint High Power Solid 
state Laser) 
Solid slab 
laser (SSL) 
Joint technology programme. 
Leveraged by Navy in MLD. 
105kW in 2009. 
 
 
Excalibur SSL/Fibre 
laser 
Scalable multipurpose laser 
system for air vehicles (A/G, 
self-defence, missile defence 
Developmental, demo 
in 2013 
100kW+ [41] 
 
LAWS (LAser Weapon System) 
[47] 
SSL/Fibre 
laser 
Ship self-protection Prototype 30kW, 
installed on USS 
Ponce 
100kW+ IOC stated 
for 2020-2021 
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Programme Name Type Purpose Status Goal 
RELI (Robust Electric Laser 
Initiative) [69] 
SSL/Fibre 
laser 
Laser programme for US Army 
and Air Force operated platforms 
 Weight less than 
7kg/kW, 30% wall-
plug efficiency,  
100kW+ 
HPM Demonstrator [29]0 HPRF C-UAS Engagement test in 
2013. Successful 
downing of small 
UAVs. 
Unknown. 
Table 36: Ongoing Programmes Pursuing AA/CRAM Capability. 
 
5.5.2. What is the Maturity Level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030? 
Only identified GBAD DEW systems were selected to answer this research question. All 
shipborne and airborne systems were also excluded as the research question is specifically about 
GBAD. Readers interested in other systems should refer to Table 35.  Furthermore,   some 
GBAD DEW systems were also excluded due to lack of adequate information to perform TRL 
assessment. In total seven systems were included, and the results are depicted in Table 37. The 
table includes columns for the current TRL assessment, predicted capability at TRL9, estimated 
time frame when the system reaches TRL9, and the assessed year when technology is 
commonly used according to the Delphi panel.  
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# Programme Name Technology TRL 
2017 
Predicted capability in 
TRL9 
 Year for TRL9 
based on TRL 
evolvement 
data 
Year when in use 
based on Delphi 
1 HPM Demonstrator [29]0  
HPRF 
 
7 
 
Mobile 
C-UAS 2km 
 
2021-2027 
HPRF 
systems 
2025-2030/ after 2035 
2 HELE/LWM (High Energy 
Laser Effector/Laser 
Weapon Module) [54] 
 
HEL 
 
6/7 
 
N/A 
 
2023-2029 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Laser  
systems 
2030-2035 
3 GBAD DE OTM (Ground 
Based Air Defence 
Directed Energy On The 
Move) [48] 
 
Laser 
 
6 
 
Mobile  
C-UAS 3km 
 
2023-2029 
4 RELI (Robust Electric 
Laser Initiative) [69][69] 
SSL/Fibre 
laser 
4/5 C-RAM/C-UAS 8km 2026-2032 
5 DPAL (Diode Pumped 
Alkali Laser) 
Gas laser 4/5 Up to ballistic missile 
defence 
2026-2032 
6 Gamma [46] SSL laser 3/4 N/A 2029-2035 
7 FEL (Free Electron 
Laser)[2][33]0 
FEL laser 2/3 Up to ballistic missile 
defence 
2032-2037 
Table 37: Maturity of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030. 
 
From the table, we can see that the three first systems (1-3) are the only systems which are 
likely to reach TRL9 by 2030. Systems 4 and 5 will only be mature by 2030 if a boost in the 
development process is witnessed. This may occur if the use of UAV’s increase drastically 
against US Forces.  Systems 6 and 7 will not be TRL9 by 2030. It is also evident that the 
capability of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030 will be quite modest and mainly focused on countering 
UAV in short to mid ranges. As a summary in 2025-2030, there will be a maximum of three 
GBAD DEW systems in TRL9 who are capable of engaging UAVs in a distance of few 
kilometres. 
 
5.5.3. What is the Applicability of DEW when Replacing or Developing 
Finland’s GBAD Capabilities after 2025?  
 
The answer to this question is presented in a separate classified annexe which will not be made 
publicly available. It has been distributed to Army Command Finland and National Defence 
University. Finnish Defence Forces personnel with adequate security clearance can obtain 
reading rights to the document through regular procedures. 
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5.6. Limitations to Findings 
The results introduced above incorporate certain limitations; firstly it needs to be appreciated 
that all the data and material are based on openly available public documents. An unclassified 
study which makes use of detailed information on a novel, defence related technology simply 
has to accept the fact that all the material is not accessible. It follows that some of the data is 
missing, some are equivocal and some may even be even misleading. This is the case although 
utmost attention was placed in verifying the data from multiple sources and by thoroughly 
assessing the integrity of the reference material.  
As a consequence, while using the TRL calculator, there was a need to make some assumptions 
due to lack of verified information. This was because in many instances the metrics required by 
the calculator were precise and that level of granularity could not be found from publicly 
available articles. Hence inserted metrics are a combination of actual information from the 
literature and assessments made by the author. It is like any simulation; the results are based on 
the inserted metrics, and this is why the TRL levels indicated here should not be regarded as 
absolute facts. Nonetheless, utilising the calculator provided us with more justifiable and 
detailed information than what we would have gotten by merely placing the systems on the 
TRL scale based on the levels description shown in Table 2. 
Furthermore, the forecasted TRL maturing timelines assume that progression and maturing 
occurs. It is vital to keep in mind that there are numerous reasons which may interfere with the 
maturing process and that not all systems ever will see TRL9, or they do but they still are not 
deployed. 
Another limitation is the relatively small number of participants in the Delphi panel. Although 
nearly six months was used in first identifying and then attempting to persuade subject matter 
experts to participate, the number remained as low as 10. This does not mean that the validity 
of the Delphi is automatically compromised as the method relies specifically on the 
identification of subject matter experts. Nonetheless, a bigger panel would have made the 
results more solid. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This chapter summarises the main findings, presents the conclusions and makes 
recommendations for further work.  
6.1. Research Aims 
It was the intention of this thesis to utilise Delphi method and Technological Readiness Level 
(TRL) assessment supported by a literature review to answer the following research question 
and the supporting sub-questions:  
 
- Research question: What is the applicability of directed energy weapons when replacing 
or developing Finland’s GBAD capabilities after 2025? 
- Sub-question 1: What are the DE technologies and systems under development for AA 
and CRAM? (SQ1) 
- Sub-question 2: What is the maturity level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030? (SQ2) 
6.2. Summary of the Research 
First, a literature review was conducted to establish the foundation of the researched topic, to 
aid in composing the Delphi questionnaires and most importantly to find an answer to sub-
question 1. The literature review was followed by the application of both Delphi method and 
TRL assessment. Next, the results of both methods were compared and discussed. Moreover, 
finally, a synthesis of the results was constructed. 
6.3. Literature Review  
The main findings of the literature research were:  
- The most prominent and mature DEW technologies today are High Energy Lasers 
(HEL) and High Power Radio Frequency Weapons (HPRF) 
- Numerous ongoing programmes are developing HEL systems accompanied with a 
smaller number of HPRF programmes 
- Both HEL and HPRF have a solid scientific foundation, and their utility as weapons 
have been researched for decades 
- There are some functioning DEW demonstrators 
- Despite the lengthy research and testing many obstacles remain to mature the 
technologies to the level where they could be deployed 
- Output powers of current DEW are far from being adequate in engaging manned aircraft 
size targets  
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- Advantages of DEW include: Collateral damage reduction, Infinite magazine, low 
engagement price, beam travels at a speed of light, ability to engage multiple targets 
simultaneously and silence 
- Disadvantages of DEW include: Size, weight and power (SWaP) issues,  cooling related 
to excess heat, precision tracking requirements due to narrow beam, collateral damage 
and fratricide issues, need for a line of sight, limitations in range and weather related 
power losses 
6.4. Delphi Method 
A Delphi survey consisting three rounds was performed to find data to answer sub-question 2 
“What is the maturity level of GBAD DEW in 2025-2030”. The survey included both classic 
and ranking type questions. It was revealed that, in this case, the classic type questions provided 
more converged answers than the ranking questions did. Based on the classic questions the 
Delphi panel’s opinion to the year when DEW’s will be commonly in use was established, and 
thus the method contributed in answering to sub-question 2. The main findings of the Delphi 
survey included: 
- Laser weapon will be commonly used by the military in 2030 
- Laser weapons will be mature enough for air defence in 2030-2035 
- HPRF weapons will be commonly used by the military in 2025-2030 
- HPRF weapons will be mature enough to be used for air defence in 2025-2030 
6.5. TRL Assessment 
TRL assessment was conducted to establish more valid and justifiable answers to sub-question 
2. The idea was to have results based on another method to either validate or invalidate the 
Delphi results. The TRL assessment was executed by employing USAF TRL calculator using 
the data revealed by the literature review. After the current TRL’s of the DEW programmes 
were assessed, a forecast was made to identify the year of full maturity (TRL9). The main 
findings of the TRL assessment were: 
- DEWs can engage UAV’s within 2-3km in 2021-2029 
- DEWs can engage UAV’s within 10 km in 2024-2030 
- DEWs can engage manned aircraft and possibly ballistic missiles from ranges exceeding 
10 km in 2026-2037 
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6.6. Recommendations for Further Work 
A number of recommendations are made for further work:  
- The application and the findings should be reviewed by a panel accessible and able to provide 
classified information. This would ensure the use of current and detailed information regarding 
the actual maturity issues concerning DEW. Furthermore, this would provide valid information 
of the actual capability issues presented in the paper. Naturally, the research would have to be 
classified. 
- A qualitative analysis of the attributes presented by the panel together with their ranking would 
provide a more insight of the obstacles forestalling the maturing of DEW. Based on this insight 
it would be possible to forecast the maturing of the DEW technology by building a technology 
roadmap encompassing the assessment of maturation timeline for individual segments of the 
particular system.  
- The Delphi results should be elaborated by two alternative means. One is to include further 
rounds to seek enhanced consensus, especially in the ranked lists. The other one is to establish 
a new and/or larger panel. By doing this, we could witness actual consensus and validity to the 
results presented. 
6.7. Concluding Statement 
This research can answer the research questions. A thorough literature review showed that there 
are numerous DEW programmes and the scientific background is solid. The application of the 
methods revealed there that the maturing of DEWs would take some 5-15 years, depending on 
the target size and range. Furthermore, the results from the individual methods support each 
other and thus make them more valid.  
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8. APPENDICES 
8.1. Inserted Values and Results of TRL Calculator 
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